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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
 
Background 
The Treaty of Lisbon provided a legal recognition of the democratic significance of 
national parliaments. It mentions national parliaments on several occasions related to their 
information rights, their participation in the procedures of revision of the treaty, their 
control over the field of Freedom, Security and Justice and their possibility to cooperate 
with each other and with the European Parliament (EP). 
The Treaty also introduced a new procedure related to the early control of the principle of 
subsidiarity. The Early Warning Mechanism (EWM) enables each assembly to assess 
whether a legislative proposal made by the Commission infringes upon the principle of 
subsidiarity. If one third of the parliaments state that action at the EU level is not 
legitimate (the so-called “yellow card”), then the Commission is required to provide further 
justification. 
Apart from the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the issue of the European 
role for national parliament has been salient on the agenda during the last years. The 
official discussions before the Brexit questioned if national parliaments should be granted 
the possibility to block early draft legislation – what has been called a “red card”. The 
progressive and complex reform of the Eurozone and the budgetary supervision opened the 
debate about the parliamentary control the economic governance of the EU. New 
forums of inter-parliamentary cooperation in economic affairs have been created while a 
debate is open in Europe on how to strengthen or modify them. 
This survey assesses those numerous evolutions while also considering the impact of the 
on-going trends related to the European legislative procedure on the capacity of the 
national parliament to control EU affairs. 
Results 
Regarding the EWM, the survey notes that this innovative procedure has been made almost 
redundant with the unprecedented context of legislative downfall at the EU level. 
Moreover, the detailed account of the three yellow cards raised so far in 2012, 2013 and 
2016 reveals that the procedure suffers both from its contingency and from the proximity 
between parliamentary majorities and national governments. 
This rather negative assessment contrasts with the dynamism of the informal system of 
dialogue between national parliaments and the Commission. Within ten years, the political 
dialogue has generated more than 4,000 opinions sent to the Commission. The procedure 
can be understood as a way to produce information related to the actors’ preferences in the 
multi-levels setting of the EU. A proposal is therefore formulated in view of systematising 
the consultation between national parliaments and the Commission at an earlier stage of 
the procedure. 
The survey also considers two emerging kinds of collective action from national 
parliaments: 
 The initiative of a “green card” allowing national parliaments to suggest a 
legislative initiative to the Commission was informally launched in 2015. Despite its 
pro-active feature, the proposal seems to fail to identify issues for which a sufficient 
number of assemblies could be mobilised on. 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
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 In February 2016, the discussions over the special status of the UK lead the 
European Council to accept a system that would block a draft proposal rejected by a 
majority of parliamentary assembly. However, the agreement regarding this kind of 
“red card” has become obsolete. 
Recently, the structures of inter-parliamentary cooperation have become numerous: 
the COSAC (created in 1989), the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on CFSP and CSDP 
(2012), the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and 
Governance (2013), and, to be arranged in 2017, a Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group 
(Europol). Beyond those formal settings, a multiplicity of initiatives can also be noted. 
 Despite such organizational creativity, the survey identifies the breaks to the 
development of a genuine and fruitful cooperation between parliaments in Europe: 
the divergences of views between national parliaments, the institutional competition 
between national parliaments and the EP, the lack of interaction and real debates 
within those fora, the various coordination costs… 
 Therefore, recommendations are formulated in view of improving inter-
parliamentary cooperation. A committee-based approach, based on existing 
standing committees within parliaments, seems more likely to develop “a feeling of 
ownership” among networks of national and European parliamentarians. 
Regarding the field of budgetary and economic coordination, the survey highlights the 
important variations in the involvement of national parliaments in the preparation of 
Stability or Convergence Programmes and National Reform Programmes. Yet, beyond the 
divergences of focus and of the extension of parliament rights, those issues are closely 
followed within national parliaments. 
The inter-parliamentary conference foreseen by Article 13 TSCG has met eight times 
since late 2013. After long negotiations, a compromise was found on its rule of procedure 
in November 2015: the conference meets twice a year and the size and composition of the 
parliamentary delegations to the conference are not fixed. Both the duration of those 
negotiations and their result lead to be pessimistic about the capacity of this new fora to 
establish a genuine democratic control over the economic governance of the EU and 
especially of the Eurozone. Therefore, several options are discussed: 
 A true Eurozone Parliament, distinct from the EP, in charge of taking major 
budgetary and financial decisions affecting the Euro Area; 
 A less far-reaching Eurozone Assembly made of MPs and MEPs; 
 A euro area component in the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic 
Coordination and Governance; 
 A euro area subcommittee within the EP established through an informal agreement 
between political groups; 
 A strengthened scrutiny of those issues within national parliaments. 
Faced with all those options, the survey strengthens that the scenarios of inter-
parliamentary cooperation are not mutually exclusive and that a key aspect of the success 
of any option lies in their organisational details and the profile of members. In that sense, 
budget specialists within parliaments seem the most able to develop a solid inter-
parliamentary network. 
To finish, this report develops a series of other contemporary challenges that national 
parliaments are facing in relation to the EU and formulates some recommendations: 
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Challenges Problems Recommendations 
Opposition How to associate 
opposition parties to 
European activities 
and inter-
parliamentary 
network? 
- Promotion of best practices at the domestic level; 
- Pluralist composition of any parliamentary 
delegation; 
- Minority opinions sent to EU institutions. 
Inter-
parliamentary 
cooperation 
How to avoid useless 
talking shops? 
- (Standing) committee-based compositions of 
parliamentary delegations; 
- Renewed working methods; 
- Clever timing of the conferences. 
Rhythm How can national 
parliaments supervise 
a legislative procedure 
that last nearly two 
years? 
- Stop solely focussing on the early period of 
legislative bargains. 
Transparency How can national 
parliaments improve 
such an unclear 
decision-making 
process? 
- More transparency regarding trilogues meetings; 
- Communication link connecting the future 
common legislative data base of the three 
institutions with the IPEX; 
- More transparency regarding the Council 
activities (political agreements, parliamentary 
reserves, agenda shifts…). 
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE UNEASY INVOLVEMENT OF 
NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN EU AFFAIRS  
KEY FINDINGS 
 National Parliaments have many assets and features that call for their active 
participation in the European political system: their democratic quality, their 
capacity to voice national concerns and their veto power over EU treaties. 
 Yet, their empowerment is problematic seeing that the constitutional organisation 
of Member States is a matter of national sovereignty. The diversity of the chambers 
also makes their collective mobilisation difficult. 
 
The subject of the involvement of national parliaments in the European Union (EU) 
decision-making process has long been discussed1. Within several Member States, the 
aftermath of the Single Act was a decisive period for the development of provisions related 
to the European activities of national parliaments2. Constitutions and Standing Orders were 
reformed in order to allow parliaments to be informed of draft European legislation and to 
give them more or less biding opinions about it. The shared view concluded that national 
assemblies should be able to scrutinize the European policy of their government as 
ministers were acting as lawmakers in Brussels. 
Less decisively and more lately, national parliaments have also been taken into account 
directly at the EU level. Since Maastricht, national parliaments have been mentioned in 
the protocols annexed to EU treaties. With the treaty of Lisbon, they were specifically 
granted some prerogatives – notably through an original procedure of aggregation of their 
individual views related to the respect for the principle of subsidiarity on each legislative 
proposal formulated by the European Commission (Commission). Different kinds of inter-
parliamentary forums have also been developed over the recent period, relating to the 
practices of parliamentary scrutiny, to foreign and security affairs or to economic and 
budgetary issues. 
1.1. The appeal of national parliaments 
 
The willingness to give a say to national parliaments was driven by two distinct factors. One 
is related to democratic norms and the other to strategy. 
First, the concerns associated to the popular legitimacy and the democratic quality of the 
EU fed the view that the system should be “parliamentarised”. The empowerment of the 
European Parliament was strongly supported by this claim. Yet, it soon became clear that 
the parliamentarisation at the EU level was not sufficient and should be expanded at the 
national level. This view was based both on the democratic quality and proximity 
given to national parliaments and on their capacity to identify and promote 
national interests and features in a period where the EU level was suspected of 
neglecting them. Thus, the Laeken declaration of 15 December 2001 that put the issue of 
national parliaments in the European agenda mentioned the possibility that they could 
                                           
1 Maurer, A. and Wessels, W. (eds), 2001. National Parliaments on their Ways to Europe: Losers or Latecomers?. 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. 
2 Rozenberg, O. and Hefftler, C., 2015. Introduction. In Hefftler, C., Neuhold, C., Rozenberg, O. and Smith, J., 
eds., The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-39, 
here: pp. 9-10. 
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realise a “preliminary checking of compliance with the principle of subsidiarity”.3 In short, 
national parliaments were considered both as a parliamentary body and as national 
organisations. 
There is another, more strategic, if not cruder, reason for the focus of the European 
institutional debate on national parliaments’ issue. It is the fact that, except if the uncertain 
procedure of referendum is used, national parliaments wield the power of veto 
regarding treaty revision. With their consent necessary to change the rules, it is clear 
that those rules foresee giving them a special role – even if this role is peripheral or 
anecdotal. In that perspective, the increasing problems of governability of European states 
politically strengthen the veto power of the parliamentary assemblies. Treaty ratifications 
could have been taken for granted in the past. It is no longer the case in the age of 
backbench rebellions and compound parliamentary majorities. The best illustration of that 
is that most of the institutional analyses now integrate the view that treaties could or 
should not be changed. 
1.2. A Europeanisation under constraint 
 
Despite those specific assets, national parliaments long appeared to be the “losers” of 
European integration. The depth of the integration of Europe has challenged both their 
roles of lawmaker and of government scrutiniser. The primacy of EU law put a major 
constraint over many decisions taken domestically. More recently, the improvement of 
budgetary coordination and control at the EU level created new and subtler boundaries for 
parliamentary action. National governments, accountable to the parliament in all European 
democracies except Cyprus, were also tempted to strategically use the European dimension 
to impose their agenda on their parliamentary majority. In summary, although European 
integration was not the only factor for the trend toward “de-parliamentarisation” at the 
domestic level, it certainly contributed to it. 
Two major reasons may explain why it was so difficult for national parliaments to “fight 
back”.4 First, collective action at national parliaments’ level is limited by their 
diversity. This diversity is internal as parliaments are made of various groupings of parties 
that must compete electorally. Considered from a comparative perspective, the notion of 
diversity also accounts for all the 41 parliamentary chambers. National parliaments have 
difficulties acting jointly given the differences of political majorities between them. The 
variations related to the extent of their constitutional power constitute a major limitation as 
well. In that context, the decision taken in 1979 that the European Parliament members 
would no longer be selected among national parliaments’ benches contributed to isolating 
them from the policy-making process. 
Secondly, the constitutional sovereignty of the Member States leads to drastically 
limiting the possibility of involving national parliaments in the EU policy-making process. As 
recalled by the first sentence of the Protocol No. 1 on the role of national parliaments in the 
EU, “the way in which national Parliaments scrutinise their governments in relation to the 
activities of the Union is a matter for the particular constitutional organisation and practice 
of each Member State”.5 The key criteria for imposing new rights for national parliaments is 
                                           
3 Presidency Conclusions, European Council meeting in Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001. 
4 Raunio, T. and Hix, S., 2000. Backbenchers learn to fight back: European integration and parliamentary 
government. West European Politics, 23 (4), pp. 142-168. 
5 Protocol No. 1 annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon (Official Journal of the European Union, C 83/206, 30.3.2010). 
See Annex 1. 
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therefore their legal and political acceptability within all Member States – a logic that 
encourages sticking to the lowest standard. 
1.3. Outline of the study 
 
The contraction between the democratic and strategic appeal of national 
parliaments and the difficulties of finding them a role backed by prerogatives 
defined at the EU level makes the assessment of their contemporary European 
activities crucial. The failure of the European Constitution in 2005 opened a period of 
informal cooperation between the Commission and the assemblies. The Lisbon Treaty, 
which came into force in 2009, foresaw new rights for national parliaments. Among them, 
an original procedure – the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM) related to the assessment of 
the respect for the principle of subsidiarity – can be considered as a combination between 
individual and collective logics of participation of the assemblies as thresholds pertaining to 
the parliamentary opinions are fixed. As a result of the consequences of the great economic 
crisis that started in 2008, new rules were implemented regarding the control over budget 
deficit. Among them, the Treaty of Stability, Convergence and Governance, enforced in 
2013, foresaw new types of inter-parliamentary cooperation. 
The last recent years were actually marked by a real creativity regarding the rules, 
practices and procedures related to national parliaments. Whereas the 1990s saw 
the reform of domestic Constitutions and Standing orders pertaining to the role of national 
parliaments, the recent period saw the multiplication of rights and forums at the EU level. 
This survey proposes to assess those recent developments considering first the new rules 
set by the treaty of Lisbon. Following, the various types of relations between the national 
parliamentary assemblies and the Commission, including EWM and the so-called “political 
dialogue”, are assessed. The fourth chapter considers the latest developments related to 
inter-parliamentary cooperation, including the relations with the European Parliament. The 
fifth chapter focuses on the emerging role for national parliaments regarding economic and 
budget coordination at the EU level. The last chapter concludes by addressing certain 
contemporary challenges and formulating recommendations to face them. 
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2. NUMEROUS BUT NOT DECISIVE? THE LEGAL 
PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY OF LISBON RELATED TO 
NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The Treaty of Lisbon ended with the traditional view that national parliaments 
should mainly be active at the domestic level. 
 Although national parliaments are mentioned in several parts of the Lisbon Treaty, 
the main new element addresses an original procedure focussed on 
subsidiarity checks. 
 However, there are many minor points that give a specific role or ambition to 
national parliaments. 
2.1. Numerous provisions 
 
Breaking with the past, the Treaty of Lisbon mentions national parliaments on many 
occasions. Table 1 lists all of the cases where this is done, either in the body of the treaties 
or in its Protocols 1 and 2 which are annexed to the Treaty and form an integral part of it: 
Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union (Protocol No. 1) 
and Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality (Protocol No. 2).6 Table 2 quotes all of the related articles.  
 
                                           
6 For the full text of the two Protocols, please see Annexes 1 and 2.   
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Table 1: The provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon related to national parliaments: an 
overview 
 
1. A symbolic recognition 
• Mention of the democratic accountability of European governments to national 
parliaments. 
• Mention of the fact that national Parliaments contribute actively to the good 
functioning of the Union. 
 
2. The control of the subsidiary principle 
• The yellow card of the EWM: one-third of the parliaments state an infringement of 
the subsidiarity proposal. The Commission decides to maintain, amend or withdraw 
it and must justify its choice. 
• The orange card of the EWM: if a majority of the parliament finds an infringement, it 
is easy for the co-legislators to reject the proposal. 
• Once a piece of legislation is adopted, governments may notify an infringement of 
the subsidiarity principle to the European Court of Justice on behalf of their national 
parliament “in accordance with their legal order”. 
 
3. Information rights 
• Direct transmission of all documents by the Commission. 
• A security period of eight weeks (previously six) between the Commission proposal 
and the Council meeting – with exceptions. 
• Notification of applications for accession to the EU. 
• Notifications of many activities from other institutions: proposals to amend the 
treaties (Article 48(2) TEU), evaluation of the implementation of the Union policies 
in the area of freedom, security and justice (Article 70 TFEU), proceedings of the 
standing committee of the Council in charge of internal security (Article 71 TFEU), 
aspects of family law with cross-border implications adopted by the ordinary 
legislative procedure (Article 81(3) TFEU), agenda and decision of the Council 
(Article 5 Protocol No. 1). 
 
4. Participation in the revision of the treaty 
• For the ordinary revision procedure: generalization of the Convention model. 
• A veto on the Passerelle clauses: when the European Council has decided that a new 
area should be subject to qualified majority voting in the Council and/or to the 
ordinary legislative procedure, the possibility exists for each national parliament to 
veto the decision within six months. 
 
5. A specific role for Freedom, Security and Justice 
• A lower threshold of one-quarter of national parliaments in the EWM. 
• An invitation to inter-parliamentary cooperation in the political monitoring of Europol 
and the evaluation of Eurojust’s activities. 
• See point 3 for more information. 
 
6. An acknowledgment of inter-parliamentary cooperation 
• Invitation to cooperate each other and with the EP. 
• Freedom allowed to the national parliaments and the EP in the organisation of inter-
parliamentary cooperation. 
• Mention of the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of 
Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC). 
• Invitation to cooperate on two fields: Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
and Commission Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); and Freedom, Security and 
Justice. 
 
Source: Author 
The Role of National Parliaments in the EU after Lisbon: Potentialities and Challenges 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 15 
Table 2: The provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon related to national parliaments: 
extracts from the treaties 
 
1. A symbolic recognition 
• Article 10(3) TEU: “[…] Member States are represented in the European Council by 
their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their governments, 
themselves democratically accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to 
their citizens.” 
• Article 12 TEU: “National Parliaments contribute actively to the good functioning of 
the Union: […].” 
 
2. The control of the subsidiary principle 
• Article 12 TEU: “National Parliaments contribute actively to the good functioning of 
the Union […] by seeing to it that the principle of subsidiarity is respected in 
accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality […].” 
• Principle: Article 3 Protocol No. 1. 
• Procedure: Articles 6-7 Protocol No. 2. 
• Court of Justice: Article 8 Protocol No. 2: “The Court of Justice of the European 
Union shall have jurisdiction in actions on grounds of infringement of the principle of 
subsidiarity by a legislative act, brought in accordance with the rules laid down in 
Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union by Member 
States, or notified by them in accordance with their legal order on behalf of their 
national Parliament or a chamber thereof.”.  
 
3. Information rights 
• Acts: Article 12 TEU: “National Parliaments contribute actively to the good 
functioning of the Union through being informed by the institutions of the Union and 
having draft legislative acts of the Union forwarded to them in accordance with the 
Protocol on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union […].” 
• Applications: Article 12 TEU: “National Parliaments contribute actively to the good 
functioning of the Union […] by being notified of applications for accession to the 
Union, in accordance with Article 49 of this Treaty […].” Article 49 TUE: “[…] The 
European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be notified of this application. 
[…]”. 
• Direct transmission: Article 2 Protocol No. 1: “Draft legislative acts originating from 
the Commission shall be forwarded to national Parliaments directly by the 
Commission, at the same time as to the European Parliament and the Council.” 
• Security period: Article 4 Protocol No. 1: “An eight-week period shall elapse between 
a draft legislative act being made available to national Parliaments in the official 
languages of the Union and the date when it is placed on a provisional agenda for 
the Council for its adoption or for adoption of a position under a legislative 
procedure. […]”.  
 
4. Participation in the revision of the treaty  
• Convention: Article 12 TEU: “National Parliaments contribute actively to the good 
functioning of the Union […] by taking part in the revision procedures of the 
Treaties, in accordance with Article 48 of this Treaty […].” 
• Convention: Article 48(3) TEU: “If the European Council, after consulting the 
European Parliament and the Commission, adopts by a simple majority a decision in 
favour of examining the proposed amendments, the President of the European 
Council shall convene a Convention composed of representatives of the national 
Parliaments, of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, of the 
European Parliament and of the Commission […].”. 
• Passerelle clauses: Article 48(7) TEU: “[…] Any initiative taken by the European 
Council on the basis of the first or the second subparagraph shall be notified to the 
national Parliaments.  If a national Parliament makes known its opposition within six 
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months of the date of such notification, the decision referred to in the first or the 
second subparagraph shall not be adopted. In the absence of opposition, the 
European Council may adopt the decision.” 
 
5. A specific role for Freedom, Security and Justice 
• Article 12 TEU: “National Parliaments contribute actively to the good functioning of 
the Union […] by taking part, within the framework of the area of freedom, security 
and justice, in the evaluation mechanisms for the implementation of the Union 
policies in that area, in accordance with Article 70 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union, and through being involved in the political monitoring of 
Europol and the evaluation of Eurojust's activities in accordance with Articles 88 and 
85 of that Treaty […].” 
• Article 85(1) TFEU: “[…] These regulations shall also determine arrangements for 
involving the European Parliament and national Parliaments in the evaluation of 
Eurojust's activities.” 
• Article 88(2) TFEU: “[…] These regulations shall also lay down the procedures for 
scrutiny of Europol's activities by the European Parliament, together with national 
Parliaments.” 
 
6. An acknowledgment of inter-parliamentary cooperation 
 
• Article 12 TEU: “National Parliaments contribute actively to the good functioning of 
the Union […] by taking part in the inter-parliamentary cooperation between 
national Parliaments and with the European Parliament, in accordance with the 
Protocol on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union.”. 
• Freedom: Article 9 Protocol No. 1: “The European Parliament and national 
Parliaments shall together determine the organisation and promotion of effective 
and regular interparliamentary cooperation within the Union.”. 
• COSAC and CFSP/CSDP: Article 10 Protocol No. 1. 
 
Source: Author 
 
Despite the high number of mentions and the EWM put aside, no major procedures or 
rights seem to emerge from the various treaty provisions related to national parliaments. 
The multiplicity of the references could even be seen as proof that no determinant way of 
embedding them into EU affairs has been found. The symbolic mention of national 
parliaments does not grant them a specific role. The mention of the various information 
rights for national parliaments can also be considered a limited type of provision as 
information is not a guarantee of influence. In addition, the direct transmission of EU 
documents had already been informally implemented since 2006. Likewise, inter-
parliamentary cooperation is welcome in several provisions of the treaties but no decisive 
procedure is foreseen. 
Yet, as stressed by Cristina Fasone and Nicolas Lupo7, those multiple provisions should be 
interpreted as a major shift. What is at stake in the multiple references to national 
parliaments is the view that their direct participation in the European decision-making 
system is legitimate. Direct relations are indeed foreseen with EU institutions: 
 
- The Commission with the direct transmission of documents from the Commission 
to national parliaments and through the EWM; 
 
- The European Parliament with various invitations to cooperate on a stable and 
institutionalised way; 
                                           
7 Fasone, C. and Lupo, C., 2016. Conclusion. Interparliamentary Cooperation in the Framework of a Euro-national 
Parliamentary System. In Interparliamentary Cooperation in the Composite European Constitution. Hart 
Publishing, pp. 345-360. 
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- The European Council given the veto rights over the passerelle clause; 
 
- More indirectly, the European Court of Justice regarding the infringement of the 
subsidiarity principle; 
 
- Collectively, the three institutions of the ordinary legislative procedure are also 
impacted due to a defining eight-week period during which no formal agreement 
is made possible. 
 
The addition of those atomized rights states that national parliaments count among the 
European players, especially regarding major issues such as the revision of the treaties 
(through the generalisation of the Convention model) and specific policy-fields such as 
Freedom, Security and Justice. 
As indicated by tables 1 and 2, national parliaments are granted with a specific role 
regarding two issues: the multiple procedures of the revision of the treaties on one hand 
and the field of freedom, security and justice on the other hand. Regarding the revision 
of the treaties, the veto power over the Passerelle clauses that enable the modification of 
the procedures without a formal treaty change can be understood as a compensation for 
the loss of compulsory parliamentary ratification granted by a revision of the treaties. 
National parliaments still possess a veto power but their vote is not compulsory. Such 
provision could assist a government facing a reluctant parliamentary majority, as it may be 
easier to avoid a vote in parliament than to obtain a formal approval during a parliamentary 
ratification. The provisions related to freedom, security and justice resulted in both the 
development of EU legislation in those fields since the years 2000s and the shared 
sentiment that these issues belong to the core of national parliamentary competencies.  
2.2. The principles of the Early Warning Mechanism 
 
The special rules related to subsidiarity checks are undoubtedly the most original ones. 
According to Protocol No. 1 and Protocol No. 2, national parliaments have eight weeks to 
deliver a reasoned opinion if they consider that draft legislation does not comply with the 
principle of subsidiarity. Each national parliament possesses two votes. In bicameral 
parliamentary systems, each of the two chambers possesses one vote. Each chamber is 
entitled to issue reasoned opinions independently.  
 
If at least one third of national parliaments (18 of the 56 votes) share the opinion that the 
draft legislation does not comply with the subsidiarity principle, it must be reviewed, 
therefore resulting in a “yellow card”. The threshold falls to one quarter for a draft 
legislative proposal submitted on the basis of Article 76 TFEU (judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters and police cooperation). After the 'yellow card' review, the authoring 
institution (usually the Commission) may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the 
legislation. Legally, the procedure does not thus impose to withdraw the text. Yet, in the 
case where the proposal is maintained or even amended, the procedure forces the 
Commission to justify why there is no infringement of the subsidiarity procedure. 
 
Under the ordinary legislative procedure, if a simple majority of national parliaments 
consider that the draft legislative proposal does not comply with the principle of 
subsidiarity, the draft must be re-examined by the Commission, therefore resulting in an 
“orange card”. After such a review the Commission may decide to maintain, amend or 
withdraw the proposal. If the Commission decides to keep the proposal it must justify its 
position. The European Parliament and Council must then consider, before concluding the 
first reading, whether the proposal is compatible with the principle of subsidiarity. If the 
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Parliament by a simple majority of its Members or the Council by a majority of 55% of its 
members consider that the proposal does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity, it is 
dropped. Specifically, in a case where a majority of national legislatures expresses a doubt 
on a subsidiarity matters and are not heard by the Commission, it will be easy for the 
Council or the EP to delete the draft proposal. 
 
This new procedure calls for several remarks: 
 
- It places national parliaments in an implicit role as the protector of national 
sovereignty. They are indeed supposed to act in view of protecting a principle 
based on the primacy of the most proximate level of government. 
 
- Rather oddly, the protocols do not allow for an assessment based on other criteria 
such as the respect for the principle of proportionality, the share of competencies 
or the legal base of the act. 
 
- The procedure mixes the individual and collective logic of participation. 
Formally, the assessment is individually done but is all the more influential if 
several individual opinions are convergent. This combination introduces the issue 
of a possible coordination to reach the thresholds. 
 
- The procedure is strictly bound by an eight-week period. While it may seem 
long for this kind of assessment, it is actually a severe constraint, given: a. the 
fact that legislatures are not always in session; b. the necessity to validate 
internally the parliamentary opinion; c. the possibility to organize coordination 
between assemblies. 
 
- In federal and heavily decentralised Member States a procedure of involvement of 
regional parliaments is made possible which creates further coordination costs. 
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3. AN UNBALANCED DIALOGUE: NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS 
& THE COMMISSION 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Within ten years, the political dialogue between national parliaments and the 
Commission has generated more than 4,000 opinions that have been sent to the 
Commission. A rather positive assessment of the procedure is achieved by 
understanding it as a way to generate information related to the actors’ 
preferences in the multi-levels setting of the EU. 
 The assessment of the EWM is more negative. This innovative procedure has been 
made almost redundant with the unprecedented context of legislative downfall at 
the EU level. Moreover, the detailed tale of the three yellow cards raised so far 
reveals that the procedure suffers both from its contingency and from the 
proximity between parliamentary majorities and national governments. 
 
This chapter first considers the Political dialogue. Political dialogue refers to an informal 
system made of parliamentary opinions sent to the Commission as well as the replies 
drafted by the Commission’ services. This chapter then proposes a synthetic assessment of 
the EWM initiated by the Treaty of Lisbon that is supposedly focussed on subsidiarity 
issues. A short final section mentions other kinds of relations between national parliaments 
and the Commission. 
3.1. The political dialogue 
 
In 2006, José Manuel Barroso, acting as President of the Commission, launched an initiative 
in view of setting new, direct, informal and dense relations with national parliaments. The 
assemblies were invited to address questions and comments on the legislative 
initiatives of the Commission to which the Commission committed to answer.8 A few 
months after the failure of the European Constitution, the initiative aimed at politicizing the 
decision-making process and reducing the gap between national politics and Brussels. 
The Commission also decided to send directly to national parliaments all the documents it 
produces including the proposals for legislation. Before that, the draft laws were required to 
transit through national bureaucracies, which resulted in delays and restrictions. As 
previously mentioned, once in force in December 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon made this 
direct transmission compulsory. 
Beyond the procedural details, the “Barroso initiative” was symbolic of a willingness to 
consider that national parliaments could – and maybe should – participate directly to the 
EU decision-making process, and not only through “their” government. In a way, the 
initiative ended with the view that there would be a monopoly in the political defence 
and representation of national interests. 
 
                                           
8 European Commission, ‘A Citizens’ Agenda: Delivering Results for Europe’, COM(2006) 211. See also: Jančić, D., 
2012. The Barroso Initiative: Window Dressing or Democracy Boost?. Utrecht Law Review 8(1), pp.78–91. 
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3.1.1. Quantitative assessment 
 
More than ten years later, a rather positive assessment can be made regarding this 
initiative; the most positive point being that the initiative still exists. Whereas many 
institutional innovations tend to be neglected once they lose the attractiveness of their 
novelty, the procedure is still frequently used. Between 2006 and 2016, more than 4,000 
opinions have been sent to the Commission. 
In details, Figure 1 indicates that after having constantly progressed from 2005 to 2012, 
the number of political dialogue opinions tends to slightly regress. This is a trend that can 
be explained in part by the lower number of legislative proposals formulated by the Juncker 
Commission.9 
 
Figure 1: Parliamentary opinions sent yearly to the Commission 
 
Note: 
- The number of reasoned opinions on subsidiarity has been taken from the Commission reports. Figures 
taken from other sources may differ given: a. the subjective assessment regarding the fact that 
parliamentary opinions should be regarded as subsidiarity ones or not; b. the fact that the Commission 
does not count proposals that have arrived after the 8-week period. 
Source:  
- 2006-2015: European Commission, Annual Reports on the relation with national parliaments. 
- 2016: European Commission 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/index_en.htm and European 
Commission General Secretariat. 
 
The aggregate data related to the letters sent to the Commission hides strong variations 
between assemblies as indicated in Figure 2. In 2016, more than half of the opinions sent 
                                           
9 The lower number of opinions sent by the “champion” of this procedure - the Portuguese assembly – also 
explains partly the trend. 
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originated from only four assemblies. Fourteen assemblies (out of 41) did not send any 
document to the Commission during that year – including the powerful German Bundestag. 
 
Figure 2:  Opinions sent to the Commission by parliamentary chambers in 2016 
 
 
Note:  
- Assemblies are indicated through the official EU country code, adding 1 for the lower assembly and 2 for 
the higher one in case of bicameral parliaments. 
- The parliamentary chambers that did not send any opinions in 2016 are AT1, BE1, BE2, CY, DE1, EL, FI, 
IE2, LU, NL1, NL2, SI1, SI2, UK2. 
Source: European Commission 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/index_en.htm 
 
If we compare the parliamentary activity regarding opinions sent to the Commission in 
2016 to the previous years, a picture of stability emerges10. A few evolutions are worth 
noticing: 
- The Portuguese assembly (PT) that sent an opinion for acknowledging the 
transmission of almost all legislative proposals has stopped doing so since 2015. 
- Both Romanian assemblies (RO1 and RO2) tend to be quite active in the dialogue 
with the Commission although their participation has been irregular since their 
accession to the EU. 
- A contradictory trend emerges in the Czech Republic: the Senate (CZ2) that used 
to be deeply involved is now less involved, whereas the opposite is true for the 
lower house (CZ1). 
- Several assemblies that were fairly active in the political dialogue seem to have 
decreased their activity in 2016. This is the case for the House of Lords (UK2) in 
the special Brexit context and, to a lesser extent, of the Luxembourgish chamber 
(LU) and the Dutch Eerste Kamer (NL2). 
- By contrast, the German Bundesrat (DE2) tends to be more active. 
 
Regarding the content of the opinions, it should be noted that most of them are focussed 
on the legislative proposals. Yet, recently, an increasing number of opinions sent have dealt 
with non-legislative documents like communications and green papers. The Commission 
indicates that, in 2015, “Eleven of the nineteen Commission documents that received most 
                                           
10 The correlation regarding the number of opinions sent by parliamentary chamber between the 2010-2015 period 
and the year 2016 is 0.85 (Portugal excluded, Pearson’s r). 
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opinions from national Parliaments fell within these categories”.11 This is the case for the 
Commission work programme for which the highest number of opinions (10) was sent in 
2015. 
3.1.2. Motivations for action 
 
Two observations can be formulated to address the reasons for unequal participation in 
parliamentary chambers to the dialogue with the Commission. 
 
 The involvement in the dialogue with the Commission is not related to the 
general level of formal prerogative of a given assembly on EU affairs. 
 
Within the framework of OPAL (Observatory of national Parliaments after the Lisbon 
Treaty), an international team of academics has ranked all parliamentary chambers 
according to their institutional prerogatives in EU affairs. They took into account many 
institutional criteria pertaining to the access to information, the scrutiny of the 
infrastructure of the assembly and the oversight rights for the period 2010–2012. Figure 3 
relates this score for each parliamentary assembly to the number of opinions it has sent to 
the Commission from 2010 to 2016. 
                                           
11 European Commission, 2016. Annual Report 2015 on Relations between the European Commission and National 
Parliaments COM(2016) 471, p. 3. 
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 Figure 3:  The opinions sent to the Commission and the institutional power of 
parliaments in EU affairs (2010–2016) 
 
Note: 
- The opinions sent cover both reasoned opinions on subsidiarity and political dialogue opinions. 
- Portugal does not appear in the graph (927 opinions, 0.43 on the index). 
- A single point was given both to Spain and Ireland due to the joint feature of the participation of their 
bicameral parliaments. 
 
Source: 
- Opinions sent 2010-2015: Auel, K. and Neuhold, C., 2016. Multi-arena players in the making? 
Conceptualizing the role of national parliaments since the Lisbon Treaty. Journal of European Public 
Policy. 
- Opinions sent for 2016: European 
Commissionhttp://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/index_en.htm 
- OPAL institutional index: Auel, K., Rozenberg, O. and Tacea, A., 2015. Fighting Back? And if Yes, How? 
Measuring Parliamentary Strength and Activity in EU Affairs. In Hefftler, C., Neuhold, C., Rozenberg, O. 
and Smith, J., eds., The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union. Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 60-93. 
 
Figure 3 clarifies that the institutional EU strength of an assembly is not related to 
the engagement in a dialogue with the Commission. There are influential parliaments 
that decided to focus on the dialogue with their own government (DE1, FI, LT, DK), and  
some powerful assemblies that decided to add the direct involvement with EU institutions to 
their already active domestic role in EU affairs (SE, DE2, CZ2). Conversely, among the less 
endowed chambers, some parliaments are neglecting the dialogue with the Commission 
(BE, EL, CY) while others seemingly seek to restore their influence or reputation through 
the EU card (RO, PT). 
 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 24 
These results hold true if we distinguish the participation in the political dialogue and the 
reasoned opinions on subsidiarity.  
 
 European parliamentary assemblies have diverse reasons for engaging in 
the dialogue with the Commission. 
 
What pushes an assembly to participate in the political dialogue or the EWM differs from 
one group of assemblies to another. 
 
Some assemblies are seemingly willing to appear as active on European issues both for a 
domestic and international audience. In that perspective, sending an opinion or even a 
letter to the Commission does not cost much and it enables to feed the yearly reports. 
 
Others tend to appear as active players at European level in order to overcome a domestic 
position of institutional inferiority. It appears that higher assemblies tend to be more 
active in the dialogue with the Commission as shown by the German, Czech or Italian 
cases.  
 
Finally, earlier studies established that sending political dialogue opinions (rather than 
subsidiarity ones) correlated fairly well with issuing EU resolutions. Over the 2010–12 
periods, the correlation rate was 0.4412. Put differently, the assemblies that send many 
parliamentary resolutions to their government on EU affairs tend also to be active 
in sending opinions to the Commission. In contrast, a similar connection cannot be 
observed for other types of EU parliamentary activity, regardless of their relation to the 
meetings of the European Affairs Committees or the plenary debates organized. Therefore, 
national assemblies that put emphasis on the concrete scrutiny of EU documents, rather 
than the public debate or the communication to the public, are more likely to send their 
views to the Commission. 
3.1.3. Qualitative assessment 
 
The procedure has been blamed for being purely formal.13 Some national parliaments 
occasionally complained about the superficiality of the answers from the Commission.14 
While this point is subjective, it can be noted that many answers are now more developed 
(often over 3 pages) and detailed. This being stated, it is true that there is indeed the 
threat that an innovative procedure developed in order to respond to democratic legitimacy 
concerns, could become a purely bureaucratic routine. The “political dialogue” is sometimes 
neither political nor a dialogue. 
 
However, our own assessment is more positive. Several elements plead for this dialogue: 
 
- The procedure is not costly for national parliaments. It does not require inter-
parliamentary coordination. It generally necessitates a limited intra-parliamentary 
coordination. Usually, the Speaker must only deliver a formal agreement to a letter 
or an opinion prepared within the European Affairs Committee or a standing 
committee. 
- The flexibility of the procedure is also appreciable. The opinions sent by the 
parliament can be general or focussed, based on legal or purely political concerns. 
They can be supportive or critical. Contrary to the EWM, the implicit philosophy of 
                                           
12 Auel, K., Rozenberg, O. and Tacea, A., 2015. Fighting Back? And if Yes, How? Measuring Parliamentary Strength 
and Activity in EU Affairs’. In Hefftler, C., Neuhold, C., Rozenberg, O. and Smith, J., eds., The Palgrave Handbook 
of National Parliaments and the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 60-93, here p. 90. 
13 Jancic, D., 2015. The Game of Cards: National Parliaments in the EU and the Future of the Early Warning 
Mechanism and Political Dialogue. Common Market Law Review 52(4), pp. 939-976. 
14 COSAC, 2012. Eighteenth Bi-Annual Report: Developments in the European Union Procedures and Practices 
Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny. 
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the procedure does not postulate that national assemblies would seek to block 
European integration. No time limit applies. Although rare, there is the possibility for 
an assembly to answer to the Commission’s reply and thus continue the dialogue. 
-  
- More generally, the political dialogue should be understood as a two-fold 
information provider procedure. First, it induces the Commission to provide 
details about its projects, strategies and objectives. It can therefore be considered 
as a classical accountability mechanism similar to parliamentary written questions 
addressed to governments. Second, the opinions received by the Commission are as 
a signal sent by national assemblies informing on the sensitivity of a given 
legislative project within a Member State. The signal is not only sent to the 
Commission but also to the government of the country and even to other Member 
States. 
An asset of the procedure being its flexibility, it is not obvious that a recommendation for 
improving its functioning is needed. Yet, one can ask whether the political dialogue could 
be stimulated early during the consultation procedure by opening a special phase 
during which the Commission officially welcomes parliamentary reactions to its legislative 
projects. Although relevant, such a reform should not limit national parliaments’ 
participation to only the early phases of the EU policy cycle (see 6.3). 
3.2. Early Warning Mechanism 
3.2.1. A redundant procedure in the age of better regulation? 
 
The Early Warning Mechanism has generated 354 opinions between the period from 2010 
to 2016 (included) – and more precisely 354 opinions that the Commission validated. As for 
the political dialogue, this average of 50 opinions a year covers important 
variations. Over the six years of existence of the procedure, the most active chambers 
have been the Swedish parliament (56 opinions) followed by the French Senate (25) and 
the Dutch lower (22) and higher (18) assemblies.15 All but one of the 41 parliamentary 
assemblies have issued at least one opinion. Some active chambers on EU issues, such as 
the Finnish parliament (3), decided to neglect the tool, as did the lower assemblies of the 
two biggest Member States with 3 opinions respectively for the Bundestag and the 
Assemblée nationale.  
The number of subsidiarity opinions sent yearly depends on the number of legislative 
proposals that the Commission has made (see Figure 4). By contrast, given the time 
needed to agree on a legislative proposal (now almost two years), the number of 
subsidiarity opinions does not correlate with the number of adopted acts (see 6.3). 
                                           
15 Auel, K. and Neuhold, C., 2016. Multi-arena players in the making? Conceptualizing the role of national 
parliaments since the Lisbon Treaty. Journal of European Public Policy, advanced online publication. 
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Figure 4: EU proposed and adopted acts and EWM opinions by year 
 
Note: The number of adopted legislative acts in 2016 is unavailable. 
Source: 
- Reasoned opinions on subsidiarity: European Commission, Annual Reports on the relation with national 
parliaments (2010-2015) and European Commission General Secretariat (2016) 
- Adopted acts: EU Legislative Output 1996-2014 [database], Centre for Socio-political Data (CDSP, CNRS 
- Sciences Po) and Centre d’études européennes (CEE, Sciences Po) [producers], Centre for Socio-
political Data [distributor]. Based exclusively on the monthly summary of Council acts. 
- Proposed acts: EUR-Lex database. 
 
The fact that the volume of subsidiarity opinions follows closely the number of legislative 
proposals partly explains their limited number. Indeed, the legislative productivity 
decreased suddenly in 2010. From 2010 to 2016, the Commission proposed an average of 
127 texts yearly versus 271 for the previous seven years. Likewise, from 2010 to 2015, the 
EU adopted an average of 92 texts versus 205 during the six preceding years. 
 
In short, a system aiming at limiting an excess of legislation at the EU level was 
implemented precisely at a time when the EU system entered into a period of 
legislative slowdown. This does not mean that the EWM is responsible for this trend but, 
in fact, that both phenomena are illustrative of the same global evolution: the EU’s 
increasing frigidity towards legislation as a public policy instrument. Be it assumed or 
imposed, this new spirit is well captured by the better regulation agenda – one of the top 
priorities of the Juncker administration16. If the principle of subsidiarity is not the only 
credo of the better-regulation agenda, it is still central to it. Therefore, the progressive 
implementation of this agenda means that the Commission has also developed tougher 
internal instruments and procedures aiming at avoiding infringement to the principle of 
subsidiarity. This has presumably contributed to lower the significance of the EWM. As said 
by a senior clerk from the French Sénat in 2015: “We don’t really need to implement 
subsidiary checks as the Commission already does the job”.17 
 
                                           
16 Kassim, H., 2016. What’s new? A first appraisal of the Juncker Commission. European Political 
Science, advanced online publication. 
17 Interview in Paris, 16 July 2015. 
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3.2.2. The three yellow card 
 
Thus far, the threshold of one third of the parliamentary assemblies has been reached on 
three occasions only. 
In 2012, a yellow card was raised for the first time on a proposed regulation on the 
exercise of the right to take collective action. Case studies have indicated that the 
fortuitous meeting of the COSAC during the 6-week period helped for reaching the 
sufficient number of opinions.18 This shows that the EWM does not merely rely on each 
assembly’s separate assessment but requires a kind of collective action. The Commission 
denied any breach of the principle of subsidiarity but decided to withdraw the proposal. 
Indeed, as the text requires a unanimous agreement within the Council, the yellow card 
was interpreted as a signal of likely opposition from some governments. 
In 2013, a second yellow card was triggered in relation to the Commission's proposal for a 
regulation establishing the European Public Prosecutor's Office. An in-depth analysis of 
the opinions showed that the assemblies were motivated by a great variety of views19. 
Some were opposed to the proposal and took subsidiarity as a pretext. Others were in 
favour of the Public Prosecutor but concerned by the control of the Commission over it – 
which means that the notion of subsidiarity was more relevant in their case. Others also 
used subsidiarity as a pretext as the proposal was not ambitious enough in their view. 
Faced with this patchwork, the Commission decided to leave the proposal unchanged. Yet, 
the signal sent by national parliaments most likely induced EU actors to accept significant 
amendments during the subsequent legislative procedure.20 Nearly four years after, the file 
is still blocked; a likely outcome being the creation of an enhanced cooperation.21 
In May 2016, in total 14 parliamentary chambers objected to the Commission's proposal for 
a revision of the Posted Workers Directive. This highly salient issue was especially a 
matter of concern in Central and Eastern countries as indicated by the parliaments raising 
opinions (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania and Slovakia).22 The parliaments from those countries were therefore 
voicing national concerns, hand in hand with the governments from this area. Under the 
pressure of Western Member States in which the issue of posted workers is also salient (but 
for different reasons) and President Juncker’s commitment to build a more social Union, the 
Commission decided again to maintain the proposal unchanged. The legislative process is 
ongoing.  
 
 
                                           
18 Cooper, I., 2015. A yellow card for the striker: national parliaments and the defeat of EU legislation on the right 
to strike. Journal of European Public Policy, 22(10), pp. 1406-1425. 
19 Fromage, D., 2016. The second yellow card on the EPPO proposal: An encouraging development for Member 
States parliaments? Oxford Yearbook of European Law 35 (1), pp. 5-27. 
20 Interview in Brussels, European Commission, 6 July 2014. 
21 See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/02/07-epo-enhanced-cooperation/ 
22 Kreilinger, V., 2016. National parliaments’ 3rd yellow card: A preliminary assessment, Euractiv.com, 12 May. 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/opinion/national-parliaments-3rd-yellow-card-a-preliminary-
assessment/; Kreilinger, V., 2016. A ‘yellow card’ and the damage done, Euractiv.com, 20 July. 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/social-europe-jobs/opinion/national-parliaments-3rd-yellow-card-a-preliminary-
assessment/  
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3.2.3. A rather negative assessment 
 
The main positive outcome of the EWM is certainly the improvement of the justification 
put by the Commission regarding the principle of subsidiarity.23 This covers not only the 
three cases where a yellow card was raised but also other legislative proposals given the 
anticipatory effects of the procedure and the official instructions given by the Commission 
leaders.   
Beyond this positive element, several critics have been formulated. While some of them can 
be relativized, two negative points emerge. 
The limited number of cases where the threshold was reached is not itself a sign 
of failure.24 As said, the Commission may have been taking better care of respecting 
subsidiarity, partly due to the existence of the EWM. It could also be argued that the 
scarcity of yellow cards strengthens the political significance of the cases where they are 
triggered. Likewise, maintaining the proposal by the Commission in two cases out of three 
is not a sign of failure either, as a yellow card may have a more subtle impact in the course 
of the legislative procedure. 
The EWM has been blamed by specialists mainly on two aspects. First, it would be too 
costly in terms of parliamentary resources for an uncertain outcome.25 The available 
time of the clerks would be more constructively oriented towards the most prevalent issues 
of the day, and among them, the control over budgetary and economic issues. The 
objection to that critic is that many assemblies have already organized an in-depth and 
comprehensive assessment of the (not so numerous) legislative proposals of the 
Commission. Also, the drafting of a reasoned opinion on subsidiarity is not so costly. One 
page is sufficient and no legal expertise is required. 
This remark touches upon the second critic made related to the focus on subsidiarity. 
Members of national parliaments (MPs) may not be the best experts on this subject. They 
may primarily be interested by the content of the issue rather than the legal categorization, 
which could lead them to divert the procedure. However, objections can be formulated to 
that critic. The political logic of the subsidiarity concept may justify a political preliminary 
assessment. Judging whether the EU level provided an added value to political action is 
largely subjective. Also, the procedure has worked so far rather well despite the ambiguity 
over the necessity to genuinely focus on subsidiarity. Many opinions that were using this 
notion as a pretext were still useful to signal to the Commission that a proposal raised 
political problems within a Member State. In a letter from the 1st of December 2009 
addressed to national parliaments, President Barroso expressed that the Commission would 
"consider all reasoned opinions raising objections as to the conformity of a legislative 
proposal with the principle of subsidiarity (...), even if the different reasoned opinions 
provide different motivations as to the non-compliance with the principle of subsidiarity".26  
 
                                           
23 Kiiver, P., 2012. The Early Warning System for the Principle of subsidiarity: constitutional Theory and Empirical 
Reality.  Routledge. 
24 Barrett, G., 2012. Monti II: The subsidiarity review process comes of age… or then again maybe it doesn’t. 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 19. 
25 de Wilde, P., and Raunio, T., 2015. Redirecting national parliaments: Setting priorities for involvement in EU 
affairs, Comparative European Politics. 
26 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/index_fr.htm. See also European 
Commission, 2012. Report from the Commission on Subsidiarity and Proportionality COM(2012) 373, pp. 4-5. 
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However, at least two elements from the incident relating to three yellow cards can be 
more negatively assessed. First, there is a high degree of contingence in reaching the 
threshold. Materially, sending opinions in due time from one third of the parliamentary 
assemblies may depend on the fortuitous physical meeting of representatives from many 
national parliaments. Cognitively and politically then, the aggregations of the reasoned 
opinions on subsidiarity hide significant disagreements between assemblies on the content 
of the proposal. To a great extent, a procedure that depends so much on chance on the one 
hand and misunderstandings on the other is fundamentally unsatisfactory. 
Second, the three yellow cards and other case studies related to the parliamentary 
procedure for adopting a subsidiarity opinion in many parliaments27 indicate a high degree 
of proximity between executive and legislative power at national level. This does not 
come as a surprise given the highly ingrained feature of parliamentary regimes in Europe 
(see 6.1). Yet, the frequent fusion between the parliamentary majority and the executive 
power raises the suspicion that the whole EWM process could be, at least in some cases, 
manipulated by members of the Council of the EU. This evokes at least two problems: the 
rupture of the institutional balance within the ordinary legislative procedure and 
the democratic justifications for associating national parliaments. As stated, the 
involvement of national parliaments in EU affairs was justified on the base of democratic 
grounds. Parliaments were, at least implicitly, expected to bring some of their democratic 
virtues within the game, whether it is called proximity, representativeness, pluralism or oral 
debates. Their capacity to do so is actually questioned, to say the least, when ministers 
hide behind them to make the most of EU bargains at an early phase. 
3.3. Hearings and meetings between national parliaments and the 
Commission 
 
There are multiple informal or less institutionalised types of contacts between the 
Commission and national parliaments.MPs from all Member States frequently travel to 
Brussels. Some organise hearings in the frame of a parliamentary report or an inquiry 
committee. Others wish to lobby many different types of decision-makers with a goal of 
obtaining subsidies or amending legislation. Some network according to party, regional or 
policy fields logics. Many use the opportunity of those ventures to meet Commission 
representatives, at administrative level or a higher level. The permanent 
parliamentary representatives in Brussels are in charge of organizing those meetings. 
Beyond the information received by MPs on the Commission project, the meetings also 
enable Commission officials to comprehend more precisely the sensitivity of a given file in a 
given country. 
Commissions are also frequently heard within the buildings of national parliamentary 
assemblies. The hearings normally take place at the committee stage but floor debates may 
occasionally be organised as well. The last report of the Commission on the relations with 
national parliaments indicate that Members of the Commission paid more than 200 visits to 
national Parliaments during the course of 2015.28 President Juncker had officially asked for 
a greater frequency of this type of event after assimilating that the multiple on-going crises 
the EU is facing necessitates the deepening of dialogue with national parliaments at a 
political level. However, the occasionally low parliamentary attendance to those hearings 
and the limited press exposure lead to a moderation of such ambition. 
                                           
27 See national contributions to: Hefftler, C., Neuhold, C., Rozenberg, O. and Smith, J., eds., 2015. The Palgrave 
Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan. 
28 European Commission, 2016. Annual Report 2015 on Relations between the European Commission and National 
Parliaments COM(2016) 471, p. 2. 
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Top representatives from the Commission also participate in the various existing inter-
parliamentary structures. In 2015 the first vice-President participated in two COSAC 
meetings; President Juncker chaired a meeting of the parliamentary week and the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, 
attended both sessions of the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP.29 Within the 
increasingly dense network of inter-parliamentary relations, developed in chapter 4, the 
Commission plays, therefore, various roles as an observer, a scrutinized body, a consensus 
builder, and a delegate. The initiative of “green card”, developed below (4.2.3), launched 
in 2015, has also been officially welcomed by the Commission which indicates in its 2016 
report: 
“The Commission recognises that national Parliaments, as the representatives of 
Europe’s citizens at national level, play an important role in bridging the gap 
between European institutions and the public. The Commission continues to respect 
the balance between the institutions active on a European level, and is mindful of its 
right of initiative. However, it has demonstrated that it is ready to consider 
suggestions from national Parliaments, like their joint initiative on food waste, that 
indicate where action at European level could bring added benefit.”30 
Lastly, the Commission periodically takes commitment toward the comprehensiveness of 
the information made available to national parliaments. In 2016, an Inter-institutional 
agreement on better law making was agreed. The document mentions national 
parliaments on two occasions.31 First, the Commission commits to make available to them 
the impact assessments of its legislative and non-legislative proposals. Second, and more 
importantly, the agreement recognizes the need for more transparency within the 
legislative procedure (see also 6.4, especially for the decisions taken within the EP). The 
text mentions that: “The three Institutions agree that the provision of information to 
national Parliaments must allow the latter to exercise fully their prerogatives under the 
Treaties” (37). Although very general, a parliamentary assembly or a group of assemblies 
could use this sentence in the future in order to obtain salient information related to the 
latest development of the bargains within trilogues meetings. 
                                           
29 Ibid, pp. 13-14. 
30 Ibid, pp. 14-15. 
31 Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the 
European Commission on Better Law-Making, OJ 2016 L 123, p. 1, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016Q0512%2801%29   
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4. PARLIAMENTARY NETWORKING AS THE NEXT STEP OF 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION? INTER-PARLIAMENTARY 
COOPERATION 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Relations between national parliaments and the European Parliament have become 
diversified; better coordination between them could be highly beneficial for 
each party. 
 COSAC is facing divergences of views about its role as well as a lack of resources 
and responsiveness. 
 The initiative to have a “green card” (allowing national parliaments to suggest a 
legislative initiative to the Commission) has been able to generate support, while 
legitimacy and effectiveness of a “red card” (giving national parliament an implicit 
blocking possibility) have been questioned. 
 New inter-parliamentary forums were created, in CFSP/CSDP in 2012, in 
Economic governance in 2013, and are to be arranged in 2017 (for Europol). The 
dominating plenary format can lead to a lack of interaction and real debate that has 
been successfully addressed on certain occasions. 
 Inter-parliamentary coordination could work more smoothly if it adopted a 
committee-based approach, if it received additional resources, if the timing of 
meetings and conferences was better and if technological advances were used. 
Some of these changes might require the revision of certain Rules of Procedures. 
This chapter broadly addresses the issue of the relations between national parliaments and 
the European Parliament before detailing the various existing types of cooperation between 
national parliaments and then within inter-parliamentary conferences and forums. The last 
section formulates recommendations with the purpose of improving inter-parliamentary 
cooperation. 
4.1. National parliaments and the European Parliament 
 
Members of national parliaments constituted the existential link between parliamentary 
representation at the national and European level until 1979, when the European 
Parliament was directly elected for the first time. In 1952, Members of the Common 
Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community chose to sit along ideological instead 
of national lines and thus created a transnational assembly. The discontinuation of “double 
hatted” MPs, although decided for good reasons, has over time led to issues of cooperation 
between the two levels. The European Parliament has been gradually empowered at every 
treaty revision since the Single European Act, e.g. with the extension of the co-decision 
procedure and its role related to the investiture of the Commission. At the same time, 
national parliaments felt marginalized in the EU and started to ‘fight back’ against their own 
executives32, and to some extent, the European Parliament as well. Both parliamentary 
levels have tried to jealously guard or extend their respective competences and have even 
                                           
32 Raunio, T. and Hix, S., 2000. Backbenchers learn to fight back: European integration and parliamentary 
government. West European Politics, 23 (4), pp. 142-168. 
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understood parliamentary prerogatives in the European multi-level system as a zero sum 
game. Inter-parliamentary relations have oscillated between conflict and cooperation.33 
However, national parliaments and the European Parliament also maintain cooperative 
relations at various levels, in various formats and constellations. These relations are direct 
if the specific purpose is cooperation between Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) 
and MPs or between civil servants. These relations are also direct with third countries 
and/or linked to international organisations if this cooperation is a goal in itself. These 
relations are indirect if, for example, their foundations are structured upon the 
parliamentarians’ party affiliation, and only create parliamentary networking as a by-
product.  
Political parties are the most obvious indirect link between MEPs and MPs from the same 
country who are members of the same (national) political party.34 Even though MEPs 
belong to transnational political groups in the European Parliament, their selection and re-
election are in the hands of national political parties that must present them as candidates. 
MPs and MEPs – as the elected representatives in parliaments at different levels of the EU’s 
multi-level system – regularly meet each other in their home countries as well as at 
gatherings of the different Pan-European political party families. In that case, parliamentary 
networking is not a goal in itself. 
Cooperation is the specific purpose of inter-parliamentary conferences and inter-
parliamentary meetings (see 4.2, 4.3 and 5.2). They unite MPs and MEPs from the same 
committees or those working on the same specific issues in order to discuss and exchange 
the best practices. Such meetings are organised either by the respective committee of the 
European Parliament and its Directorate for Relations with National Parliaments, by the 
“Presidency Parliament”, or by an individual national parliament. Alongside these networks 
that are part of the institutional system of the EU, there are Inter-Parliamentary 
Institutions35: for example, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean 
has MPs and MEPs as participants.  
However, not only parliamentarians network with each other, but also the civil servants 
of parliamentary administrations.36 The highest-ranking officials of parliaments (the 
Secretary Generals) meet twice a year. One of the strongest networks between officials is 
between National Parliaments’ representatives in Brussels who meet every Monday morning 
and who are responsible for exchanging with their peers and liaise with EU institutions.37 
The European Parliament does not partake in those meetings.  
Finally, over the last few years, parliamentary networks have become more 
differentiated and clustered.38 For instance, the French National Assembly hosted inter-
parliamentary meetings on EU trade policy in June 2015 and on Corporate Social 
                                           
33 Neunreither, K., 2005. 'The European Parliament and National Parliaments: Conflict or cooperation?'. The 
Journal of Legislative Studies, 11 (3-4), pp. 466-489. 
34 See for instance: Wonka, A. and Rittberger, B., 2014. The ties that bind? Intra-party information exchanges of 
German MPs in EU multi-level politics. West European Politics 37(3), pp. 624-643. 
35 Costa, O., Dri, C. and Stavridis, S., eds., 2013. Parliamentary dimensions of regionalization and globalization: 
the role of inter-parliamentary institutions. Palgrave Macmillan. 
36 Högenauer, A.-L., Neuhold, C. and Christiansen, T., 2016. Transnational Bureaucratic Networks in the EU: The 
Role of Parliamentary Officials in Inter-Parliamentary Coordination and Control. In Parliamentary Administrations 
in the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 51-68. 
37 Neuhold, C. and Högenauer, A.-L., 2016. An information network of officials? Dissecting the role and nature of 
the network of parliamentary representatives in the European Parliament. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 
22(2), pp. 237-256. 
38 Fromage, D., 2016. Increasing Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation in the European Union: Current Trends and 
Challenges. European Public Law, 22(4), pp. 749-772; here: pp. 761-762. 
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Responsibility in May 2016.39 Another example are two meetings related to Article 13 of the 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) that the Danish Folketing 
organised in December 2012 and April 2013 in order to discuss the foundation of what is 
now known as the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and 
Governance.40 Some of these new and informal networks no longer include participants 
from all Member States and some of these networks exclude the European Parliament in 
order to allow for the coordination that takes place exclusively between national 
parliaments. 
These examples demonstrate that the relations between national parliaments and the 
European Parliament have become diversified. Many networking activities transpire. A 
recent example is provided by an initiative taken in 2014 by the President of the EP in 
order to elaborate shared assessments of the European legislation with national 
parliaments.41 The following sections investigate in details different aspects of 
parliamentary networking: the coordination mechanisms between national parliaments 
(4.2), the multiplication of parliamentary forums (4.3), and the possibilities to improve 
inter-parliamentary coordination (4.4) are examined in greater detail. 
4.2. Coordination between national parliaments 
 
The existing scheme to involve national parliaments into the political process of the EU 
relies to a large extent on coordination between national parliaments. This was a deliberate 
choice, as alternative models, such as creating a “third chamber” composed of national 
parliamentarians, were not pursued at the European Convention.  
According to Article 12 TEU, national parliaments “contribute actively to the good 
functioning of the Union [...] by taking part in the inter-parliamentary cooperation between 
national Parliaments and with the European Parliament”.42 The precise legal basis for inter-
parliamentary cooperation can be found in Protocol No. 1: “the organisation and 
promotion of effective and regular inter-parliamentary cooperation within the Union shall be 
determined by the European Parliament and National Parliaments”.43  
4.2.1. The COSAC 
 
Article 10 of Protocol No. 1 specifies the following:  
“a conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs […] shall […] promote 
the exchange of information and best practice between National Parliaments and the 
European Parliament, including their special committees. It may also organise inter-
parliamentary conferences on specific topics […]. Contributions from the conference 
shall not bind National Parliaments and shall not prejudge their positions”.44 
This provision of the Protocol No. 1 recognises the COSAC, which was established in 1989 
and started an incremental process of strengthening the coordination of national 
                                           
39 Ibid 
40 Ibid, p. 760. 
41 European Parliament, 2016. Relations between the European Parliament and national Parliaments under the 
Treaty of Lisbon, Annual report 2014/2015, p. 14.  
42 Article 12 TEU. 
43 Protocol No. 1 on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union annexed to the European Union 
Treaties, Article 9. 
44 Protocol No. 1 on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union annexed to the European Union 
Treaties, Article 10. 
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parliaments.45 Since then, COSAC has helped to narrow differences in parliamentary 
scrutiny between national parliaments. This has led to strengthening the provisions for 
timely and complete information to national parliaments for the ministerial and subsidiarity-
related control, both in national provisions and when the EU Treaties were revised. While 
some national parliaments would welcome boosting the collective influence of parliaments 
or creating joint scrutiny, COSAC has, if at all, only marginally contributed to this. 
This is due to the divergence of views of national parliamentary delegations regarding 
both the role that this forum should take and the topical European issues for discussion. 
Some chambers traditionally advocate a minimal role and want to focus on information 
exchange about parliamentary practices while others, such as the French chambers, 
support a more active version.46 
Another reason for COSAC’s weakness is that its suffers from a lack of resources: The 
small COSAC Secretariat and the national parliament of the Member State holding the 
rotating Council Presidency (the “Presidency Parliament”) share the organisational burden 
of inter-parliamentary coordination, together with the preceding and the future Presidency 
Parliament and the European Parliament’s “Directorate for Relations with National 
Parliaments”. 
An additional weakness of COSAC is that its meetings are not responsive to recent 
developments, as their agenda is set in place well in advance. An exception is the attempt 
of the Luxembourg Presidency Parliament to “welcome” the EU’s migration agenda in 
COSAC’s non-binding contribution in late 2015 (issued and addressed to the EU institutions 
after each meeting), but parliamentarians from some Central and Eastern European 
countries opposed this wording.47 Eventually a compromise was found: 
“COSAC acknowledges that a majority of Parliaments welcomes the European 
Commission's proposal for a permanent relocation mechanism of refugees; looks 
forward to the proposal for a permanent resettlement scheme and to the reform of 
the Dublin Regulation. At the same time, COSAC acknowledges several Parliaments’ 
reservations regarding these measures proposed by the European Commission”.48 
Addressing topical questions in inter-parliamentary coordination and prioritizing it in the 
overall EU institutional calendar could encourage MPs and MEPs to participate more actively 
in COSAC. In addition to that, even though the format of COSAC has served as a blueprint 
for the other inter-parliamentary conferences, COSAC plenary sessions offer little room for 
spontaneous discussions because they are dominated by prepared speeches. It would be 
easily possible to adapt the working methods in these plenary sessions and other inter-
parliamentary conferences. Whether the Dutch Presidency Parliament’s more interactive 
formats of early 2016 (e.g. shorter statements and presentations, parallel working groups 
during a session) will serve as a model for future Presidency Parliaments remains to be 
discovered. 
Initially created only as a place to exchange information and best practices, COSAC has 
nevertheless become a place for coordination that can make a positive difference for 
                                           
45 See the COSAC website: http://www.cosac.eu/en  
46 See for example Thomas, A., and Tacea, A., 2015. The French Parliament and the European Union: Shadow 
Control through the Government Majority. In Hefftler, C., Neuhold, C., Rozenberg, O. and Smith, J., eds., 2015. 
The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 170-90. 
47 Gostynska-Jakubowska A., 2016. The role of national parliaments in the EU: building or stumbling blocks? Policy 
Brief, Centre for European Reform, p. 9. 
48 Contribution of the LIV COSAC, Luxembourg, 30 November to 1 December 2015, Official Journal of the 
European Union (2016/C 29/01). 
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reaching the threshold for a “yellow card”49. It is also at the inter-parliamentary forum 
where reform proposals that would help to improve the coordination between national 
parliaments, e.g. the “green card” (see below), have been regularly discussed.  
4.2.2. Red cards 
 
In 2015, as one of its demands for reforming the EU, the UK government had suggested 
the idea to introduce a “red card” that would enable national parliaments to block 
draft EU legislation. The proposal that the President of the European Council offered in 
February 2016 sought to make the EWM more efficient: 55% of national parliaments would 
be able to challenge a draft legislative act; it would then be discussed in the Council of the 
EU which would discontinue the consideration of the draft legislative act in question unless 
the draft was amended to accommodate the subsidiarity concerns of national parliaments.50 
The substantiality of the very idea to introduce such a “red card” and the effectiveness of 
the proposal has been widely questioned.51 It should be noted that the decision of February 
2016 was less radical than the initial request made by the British government. No 
automatic parliamentary veto over a draft act is explicitly foreseen since the Council of the 
EU is given the possibility to decide. Yet, what would change under this new agreement 
was the possibility to by-pass the Commission view on the issue of the infringement of 
subsidiarity – a point that is not negligible given its past reactions when yellow cards were 
raised. In addition, in the context of the Brexit and the British sensitivity for parliamentary 
sovereignty, the common understanding of this decision was that a draft legislative act 
would be discontinued should the 55% threshold be reached.  
Even though the agreement has become obsolete after the British referendum on 23 June 
2016 saw a majority voting to leave the EU, the topic has not disappeared from the political 
agenda. For instance, the “red card” was mentioned in a background note for the COSAC 
plenary in November 2016 that had been prepared by the Slovak Presidency Parliament.52 
4.2.3. Green cards 
 
The “green card” is another example of an initiative to strengthen national parliaments. It 
refers to the possibility for national parliaments to suggest a legislative initiative to the 
Commission. It would add a possibility for willing national parliaments to play a proactive 
role in the EU agenda-setting process and to further contribute to the good functioning of 
the EU in addition to the already existing forms of parliamentary scrutiny and involvement. 
Many supporters of a stronger role for national parliaments prefer this “green card” 
mechanism that would strengthen the “political dialogue” to the idea of a “red card”.  
                                           
49 Cooper, I., 2015. A yellow card for the striker: national parliaments and the defeat of EU legislation on the right 
to strike. Journal of European Public Policy, 22(10), pp. 1406-1425. 
50 European Council, 2016. Draft Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European 
Council, concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union. EUCO 4/16, Section C. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/president/pdf/new-settlement/  
51 Rozenberg, O., 2013. Killing the EU rather than quitting it. Policy Network. http://www.policy-
network.net/articles/4484/Killing-the-EU-rather-than-quitting-it ; Kreilinger, V., 2015. David Cameron’s proposal 
to give national parliaments a ‘red card’ over EU laws is deeply flawed. LSE EUROPP Blog. 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/11/10/david-camerons-proposal-to-give-national-parliaments-a-red-card-
over-eu-laws-is-deeply-flawed/ ; Hagemann, S., Hanretty, C. and Hix, S., 2016. Red card, red herring: 
Introducing Cameron’s EU ‘red card procedure’ will have limited impact. LSE EUROPP Blog. 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/02/13/red-card-red-herring-introducing-camerons-eu-red-card-
procedure-will-have-limited-impact/  
52 Plenary Meeting of the LVI COSAC, Bratislava 13 – 15 November 2016, Discussion Note, Session 2: 
Strengthening the Role of National Parliaments in the EU.  
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In 2015, the Luxembourg Presidency Parliament was mandated to establish a COSAC 
working group on strengthening the political dialogue by introducing a “green card”. 
According to a survey that was prepared for a meeting of this working group, the “green 
card” had gathered support.53 However, different interpretations of how a “green card” 
should be conceived have emerged among national parliaments.54 Each of three slightly 
different ideas for “green card” mechanisms to send legislative proposals to the 
Commission is backed by a significant number of the 41 national parliaments and 
chambers in the EU: There are 22 national parliaments in favour of submitting new 
legislative initiatives, 20 in favour of proposing amendments to existing legal texts, and 18 
in favour of suggesting the withdrawal of existing laws – the latter idea cannot legitimately 
be interpreted as supporting a “red card”, since the “green card” would be a proactive, 
non-binding instrument for involving national parliaments on the basis of existing treaty 
provisions.55 
Table 3:  National parliaments’ coloured cards 
 
 
Status Legal basis 
Threshold 
(% of national 
parliaments) 
Effect 
“Yellow 
Card” EWM entered 
into force in 
2009 
Protocol No. 2 to 
EU Treaties 
 
33% Commission to 
reconsider a draft 
legislative act “Orange 
Card” 
50% 
“Red 
Card” 
European 
Council Proposal 
in 2016 
(did not enter 
into force) 
(Draft) European 
Council 
decision56 
55% 
Common 
understanding 
that draft 
legislative act 
would be 
discontinued 
“Green 
Card” 
Informally used 
since 2015 
none (25%) 
Suggesting a 
legislative 
initiative to the 
Commission 
 Source: Author 
National parliaments have started to use the instrument of issuing a “green card” in an 
informal way. They have emphasised that the “green card” would enhance the existing 
political dialogue and would allow national parliaments to submit non-binding political 
and legislative suggestions to the Commission, without undermining its right of 
legislative initiative under the EU Treaties or its competences in the EWM. For the case of 
                                           
53 Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 2015. Information Note in 
relation to the COSAC Working Group, “Green card” (enhanced political dialogue) 
http://www.eu2015parl.lu/Uploads/Documents/Doc/114_2_Information note_Green card_20151026.pdf   
54 Fasone, C. and Fromage, D., 2016, From Veto Players to Agenda-Setters? National Parliaments and their ‘Green 
Card’ to the European Commission. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 23 (2), pp. 294-317, 
here: p. 307. 
55 Kreilinger, V., 2015. David Cameron’s proposal to give national parliaments a ‘red card’ over EU laws is deeply 
flawed. LSE EUROPP Blog. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/11/10/david-camerons-proposal-to-give-
national-parliaments-a-red-card-over-eu-laws-is-deeply-flawed/  
56 European Council, 2016. Draft Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European 
Council, concerning a New Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union. EUCO 4/16, Section C. 
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formally implementing the “green card”, the same voting system as for the EWM, a 25% 
threshold and a longer deadline, e.g. 16 weeks or six months, have been discussed.57  
The House of Lords EU Select Committee had originally proposed the idea of such an 
enhanced political dialogue in its report on the role of national parliaments in the EU in 
March 2014 and invited national parliaments to sign an initiative of a “green card” on the 
specific topic of food waste without a specific threshold or deadline.58 After the Commission 
had initially made a proposal in July 2014, which included an “aspirational objective” to 
reduce food waste by 30% by 2025, the new Commission withdrew it in order to present a 
revised proposal by the end of 2015. The “green card” sent by 16 chairpersons of 
national parliaments and chambers on 22 July 2015 to influence this new proposal 
called upon the Commission to adopt a strategic approach to the reduction of food 
waste.59 Instead of simply formulating vague and consensual wishes, national parliaments’ 
text was rather detailed in terms of procedures and policies to be implemented. In addition, 
a European Parliament resolution of 9 July 2015 on moving towards a circular economy also 
referred to food waste. 60 
On 17 November 2015 the Commission replied to the “green card” that it was “working 
hard on an ambitious circular economy package”, that it was “not possible at this stage to 
comment on specific initiatives [against food waste] that may form part of it”61, but 
promised to pay particular attention to national parliaments’ suggestions. In its 
report on Relations with National Parliaments, the Commission stressed, “Some of the 
suggestions on food donation, data collection and monitoring were subsequently reflected 
in the circular economy package adopted in December [2015].”62 A recent report by the 
European Court of Auditors, however, notes that the Commission’s ambition with respect to 
food waste has decreased over time.63 
The circular economy package is now in the EU legislative process. When looking at the five 
priorities in their “green card”64, the proposal does not reflect what national parliaments 
had intended. The Commission’s own assessment in the 2015 Annual Report on Relations 
with national parliaments, published on 15 July 2016, seems therefore flattering compared 
to the reality of the situation.  
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2016, p. 40-41. http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7552  
60 European Parliament, 2015. Resolution of 9 July 2015 on resource efficiency: moving towards a circular 
economy (2014/2208(INI)). http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2015-
0266&language=EN&ring=A8-2015-0215  
61 European Commission, 2015. Reply to the “Green Card”, Brussels, 17 November 2015, C(2015) 7982 final. 
62 European Commission, 2016. Annual Report 2015 on Relations between the European Commission and National 
Parliaments. COM (2016) 471 final, p. 11. 
63 European Court of Auditors, 2017. Combating Food Waste: an opportunity for the EU to improve the resource-
efficiency of the food supply chain. Special report no 34/2016, 17 January 2017, p. 20-22. 
http://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=40302  
64 These five priorities are: 1. EU Food Donation Guidelines for food donors and food banks; 2. An EU co-ordination 
mechanism to support the sharing of best practices between Member States on food waste prevention, reduction 
and management strategies; 3. European Commission monitoring of the business-to-business cross-border food 
supply chain; 4. A European Commission recommendation on the definition of food waste and on data collection; 
and 5. The establishment of a horizontal working group within the Commission. See Priestley, S., 2016. Food 
Waste. House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper Number CBP07552, 30 August 2016, p. 40-41. 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7552 
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Since this first “green card”, the French Assemblée nationale has initiated a “green card” on 
EU corporate social responsibility, signed in July 2016 by seven other parliamentary 
chambers.65 This prompted the Commission to highlight in its reply (15 December 2016) 
the series of actions related to corporate social responsibility that it has undertaken.66 The 
Latvian Saeima has put forward another “green card” on the revision of the Audiovisual 
Media Services Directive in November 201567. However, although discussed in national 
parliaments, the proposal has not gained as much traction as the two other “green card” 
initiatives.68  
The weak support for the French and Latvian initiatives suggests that the idea of “green 
card”, although innovative, will face difficulties to be implemented in the future, especially 
if the proposals deal with less consensual issues than the environment. The European 
Parliament’s resolution, “Possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional 
set-up of the European Union”, adopted in February 2017, supports a “green card”. It 
suggests “complementing and enhancing the powers of national parliaments by introducing 
a ‘green card’ procedure whereby national parliaments could submit legislative proposals to 
the Council for its consideration.”69 
4.3. The on-going multiplication of parliamentary forums 
 
Since 2012, the Lisbon Treaty and the TSCG have introduced policy-specific inter-
parliamentary conferences, which are a new development in inter-parliamentary 
cooperation: the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on CFSP and CSDP was established in 
2012, and a year later, the area of Economic and Financial Governance followed (see 
5.2).70 The European Parliament resolution on “improving the functioning of the European 
Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty” (adopted in February 2017) stresses 
“the importance of cooperation between the European Parliament and national parliaments 
in joint bodies […] on the basis of the principles of consensus, information-sharing and 
consultation”.71 In addition, a new joint parliamentary body in the area of Justice and Home 
Affairs will start its scrutiny activities in 2017.72 It is important to note that many MPs 
from sectoral committees who then meet their counterparts from the European 
Parliament have been less engaged in EU-related activities than their colleagues 
from the European affairs committees of national parliaments.  
                                           
65 Assemblée nationale, 2016. Corporate social responsibility: proposal for an initiative by the European 
Commission, Letter to Vice-President Timmermans, 11 July 2016.  
66 European Commission, 2016. Reply to the “Green Card” on corporate social responsibility, Brussels, 15 
December 2016, C(2016) 8597 final. 
67 Saeima of the Republic of Latvia, Proposal for the green card on the revision of the Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive 2010/13, Letter to Chairpersons of European Affairs Committees, 23 November 2015.  
68 Conference of Speakers of the EU Parliaments, 22-24 May 2016. Background Note. 
Session III: The Role of National Parliaments and Interparliamentary Cooperation, p. 2. 
http://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/dossier/files/download/082dbcc55497c086015499bfd16a012f.do  
69 European Parliament, 2017. Resolution of 16 February 2017 on possible evolutions of and adjustments to the 
current institutional set-up of the European Union (2014/2248(INI)). P8_TA-PROV(2017)0048, para. 60. 
70 Hefftler, C. and Gattermann, K., 2015. Interparliamentary cooperation in the European Union: Patterns, 
problems and potential. In Hefftler, C., Neuhold, C., Rozenberg, O. and Smith, J., eds., The Palgrave Handbook of 
National Parliaments and the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 94-115. 
71 European Parliament, 2017. Resolution of 16 February 2017 on improving the functioning of the European Union 
building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty (2014/2249(INI)). P8_TA-PROV(2017)0049, para. 21. 
72 See Regulation (EU) No 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the 
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and its Article 51(2). 
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The Inter-Parliamentary Conference on CFSP and CSDP succeeded the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU).73 It also replaced the regular meetings of 
chairpersons of the relevant parliamentary committees. This inter-parliamentary conference 
meets twice a year, each time in the Member State that holds the Council Presidency. It is 
based on Article 10 of Protocol No. 1, which states that COSAC may “organise 
interparliamentary conferences on specific topics, in particular to debate matters of 
common foreign and security policy, including common security and defence policy.” 
Parliamentary control of CFSP and CSDP has been assessed “multidimensional” due its mix 
of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism.74 Coordination between national 
parliaments and the European Parliament in a specific forum could therefore be particularly 
useful for the parliamentary scrutiny of a policy area traditionally dominated by the 
executive(s). The meetings can move beyond CFSP/CSDP narrowly defined and have 
already addressed issues such as trade, neighbourhood or migration policy. The High 
Representative usually addresses the conference in a keynote speech followed by a Q&A 
session. However, the Inter-Parliamentary Conference is not the only parliamentary 
forum that brings together MPs and MEPs in this policy area; the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the European Parliament regularly organises inter-parliamentary meetings on 
specific topics in Brussels.75  
In addition, Article 85 TFEU and Article 88 TFEU provide for inter-parliamentary control over 
Europol and Eurojust.76 A new inter-parliamentary forum, the Joint Parliamentary 
Scrutiny Group (JPSG), is currently being established on the basis of the revised Europol 
regulation of 2016.77 Its purpose is to “politically monitor Europol’s activities in fulfilling 
its mission, including as regards the impact of those activities on the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of natural persons.”78 In the emerging “Security Union” that the EU seeks to 
create, and in reaction to recent terrorist attacks, the JPSG could thus play an essential role 
to ensure its parliamentary control.  
Table 3 provides an overview of the various forms of inter-parliamentary cooperation 
evoked above. Although being neither a pure inter-parliamentary setting nor a permanent 
organisation, the Convention method, initiated in 1999 for the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights79 and used for preparing the European Constitution in 2002-2003, has been added 
as the Treaty of Lisbon made it compulsory before ordinary treaty revisions. Even if the 
failure of European Constitution does not help to legitimate this original setting, a new 
convention may be called in the future – possibly without an immediate mandate to change 
the treaties. Indeed, in the context of the multiple crises that Europe is facing and of the 
“existential doubts” of the EU, the joint meeting of representatives from both national 
                                           
73 Herranz-Surrallés, A., 2014. The EU’s multilevel parliamentary (battle) field: Inter-parliamentary cooperation 
and conflict in foreign and security policy. West European Politics, 37(5), pp. 957-975. 
74 Butler, G., 2015. The Interparliamentary Conference on the CFSP/CSDP: A new forum for the Oireachtas in Irish 
and EU foreign policy? Irish Studies in International Affairs, 26, pp. 163-186. 
75 E.g. an Inter-parliamentary committee meeting with the topics "Toward the NATO Summit in Warsaw" and 
"Conflicts in the MENA region" on 23 February 2016. 
76 Article 85(1) TFEU: “[…] These regulations shall also determine arrangements for involving the European 
Parliament and national Parliaments in the evaluation of Eurojust's activities.” Article 88(2) TFEU: “[…]These 
regulations shall also lay down the procedures for scrutiny of Europol's activities by the European Parliament, 
together with national Parliaments.” 
77 Regulation (EU) No 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 on the European 
Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). 
78 Article 51(2) of Regulation (EU) No 2016/794 on Europol. 
79 On 15 and 16 October 1999, the European Council of Tampere decided to settle a Convention composed of 
representations of national parliaments, national government, the EP and the Commission in view of preparing the 
Charter for fundamental rights. 
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parliaments and of the institutional triangle could appear as relevant for granting the EU 
with renewed foundations. 
Table 4: Inter-parliamentary conferences and forums within the EU   
 
 
Year of 
creation 
Legal basis Composition 
EU Speakers’ Conference 1963 
Not explicitly 
recognised by the 
EU Treaties 
1 per Member 
State + 1 
European 
Parliament 
COSAC 1989 
Protocol No. 1 
annexed to the EU 
Treaties, Title II 
6 MPs per 
Member State + 
6 MEPs 
Convention related to the 
ordinary revision procedure of 
the Treaties 
1999 / 
2009 
European Council 
initiative, now 
Article 48 TEU 
2 MPs per 
Member State + 
MEPs80 + 1 
representative 
by MS + 1 
Commission 
representative 
Inter-Parliamentary 
Conference on CFSP and CSDP 
2012 
Protocol No. 1 
annexed to the EU 
Treaties, Title II 
6 MPs per 
Member State + 
16 MEPs 
Inter-Parliamentary 
Conference on Stability, 
Economic Coordination and 
Governance 
2013 
Article 13 TSCG; 
Protocol No. 1 
annexed to the EU 
Treaties, Title II 
Composition and 
size of 
delegations 
determined by 
each Parliament 
Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny 
Group (Europol) 
2017 
Article 88 TFEU; 
Europol 
Regulation81 
To be 
determined 
 Source: Author 
While the precise institutional design of the JPSG remains to be seen, a key criticism of 
plenary-like settings in COSAC and other inter-parliamentary conferences that has often 
been made is the succession of speeches and a lack of interaction and real debate. The 
“best practices” identified by the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on CFSP/CSDP in 2014 
refer to some of these issues and suggest, for instance, to “consider shifting the balance 
from lengthy plenary presentations by the speakers to more time for questions and 
                                           
80 So far the number of MEPs has corresponded to the total number of Member States plus one.  
81 See Article 51(2), Regulation (EU) No 2016/794 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2016 
on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) and its. 
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answers.”82 The EU Speakers’ Conference, although not explicitly recognised by the EU 
Treaties, has a coordinating function for inter-parliamentary cooperation.83  
4.4. Which improvements for inter-parliamentary coordination? 
 
Ever-closer inter-parliamentary coordination has led to a significant increase in the 
number of inter-parliamentary meetings and conferences. On the positive side, MPs who 
are not members of the European affairs committees of national parliaments are becoming 
involved in inter-parliamentary coordination. The conclusion of this report will return to the 
fact that a committee-based approach seems to be the most promising evolution 
regarding inter-parliamentary cooperation. In nearly all of the national parliamentary 
assemblies as well as in the European Parliament, the standing committees constitute solid 
organisational bases granted with specific prerogatives and, above all, supported by a 
collective identity. They constitute therefore the most relevant entry for transnational 
parliamentary networking provided that equivalent structures exist all around Europe – 
which is sometimes the case (for instance, regarding foreign affairs) and sometimes not 
(for instance, regarding environment). 
Yet, on the negative side, limited time and resources that MPs and MEPs are able to 
dedicate to such initiatives have led to complaints about a lack of focus and impact of many 
such meetings and conferences. There are five broad options to improve inter-
parliamentary coordination under the unchanged framework of the existing treaties: 
1. Modify the Rules of Procedure of the conferences in order to make them more 
effective and efficient: 
The internal functioning of inter-parliamentary conferences is subject to their Rules 
of Procedure. These were agreed by consensus and the formal approach to 
improving inter-parliamentary coordination at these conferences is by changing 
these rules and incorporating as many of the improvements proposed below. Seeing 
as such processes are cumbersome, it might be preferable to start by implementing 
these changes in an informal way. 
2. Dedicate additional resources to inter-parliamentary coordination: 
Currently, the national parliament of the Member State holding the rotating Council 
Presidency (the “Presidency Parliament”), the European Parliament’s “Directorate for 
Relations with National Parliaments” and the small COSAC Secretariat share the 
organisational burden of inter-parliamentary coordination. National parliaments’ 
representatives in Brussels and Interparliamentary EU Information Exchange (IPEX) 
officers as well as other dedicated parliamentary officials in national capitals provide 
support and information. In order to boost the organisational and 
administrative structure for inter-parliamentary coordination, these actors 
could be strengthened individually, or a new and independent “General Secretariat 
for Inter-Parliamentary Coordination” could be created with its own staff and 
budget, supported with contributions from national and European level. 
3. Improve the timing of meetings and conferences: 
                                           
82 Interparliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP). Best Practices. Senate of the [Italian] Republic. 5-7 November 2014. 
83 Fasone, C. (2016). Ruling the (Dis-)order of Interparliamentary Cooperation? The EU Speakers' Conference', in 
Lupo, N. and Fasone, C. (eds.), Interparliamentary Cooperation in the Composite European Constitution. Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, pp. 269-289, here: pp. 278-288. 
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Inter-parliamentary conferences could meet before relevant European Council 
meetings in order to allow for the conferences to provide suggestions to the agenda 
of the summits. It is crucial to position inter-parliamentary coordination in the 
overall calendar of the EU institutions and would encourage MPs and MEPs to 
participate actively in those conferences.84 
4. Conduct meetings and conferences in a more interactive way: 
The Dutch Presidency Parliament (January to June 2016) was applauded for 
conducting the meetings and conferences that it had organised in a more 
interactive way. This approach meant shorter introductory statements and 
presentations, a session with parallel working groups at an inter-parliamentary 
conference, a real debate between two panellists or a special plenary session 
according to the 'catch-the-eye' principle. Thereby the Dutch Parliament followed a 
recommendation that it had set out in its own report on the role of national 
parliaments in the EU.85 Such innovations are easy to implement and only depend 
on the willingness of the actors to make use of them.  
5. Upgrade the overall working method: 
Even though most inter-parliamentary meetings and conferences are live-streamed 
and videoconferences have started to replace face-to-face meetings of minor 
importance, this kind of inter-parliamentary coordination is still in its first 
stages/infancy. Technological advances reduce the necessity to travel. At the 
same time, they can help to increase the frequency of coordination and thus 
establish a much closer cooperation without requiring more time and financial 
resources.  
As EU leaders are reluctant to embark on an ordinary revision of the Treaties following 
Article 48(2)-(5) TEU and call a European Convention86, one could also seek to relaunch 
the Assizes which were only convened once in November 1990, when 258 
parliamentarians, from both the national and the European level, met in Rome. However, 
the conference exposed divergences of interests and views between the European 
Parliament and national assemblies.87 
 
 
 
 
                                           
84 Kreilinger, V. and Rozenberg O., 2013. Written Evidence for the House of Lords European Union Committee 
Enquiry on “The role of National Parliaments in the European Union”, para. 12.  
85 Tweede Kamer, 2015. Ahead in Europe – on the role of the Tweede Kamer and national parliaments in the 
European Union, p. 27; p. 36. See also: 
https://www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/sites/www.houseofrepresentatives.nl/files/news_items/ahead_in_europe_t
cm181-238660_0.pdf  
86 See Article 48(3): “If the European Council, after consulting the European Parliament and the Commission, 
adopts by a simple majority a decision in favour of examining the proposed amendments, the President of the 
European Council shall convene a Convention composed of representatives of the national Parliaments, of the 
Heads of State or Government of the Member States, of the European Parliament and of the Commission.” 
87 Rozenberg, O. and Hefftler, C., 2015. Introduction. In Hefftler, C., Neuhold, C., Rozenberg, O. and Smith, J., 
eds., The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-39, 
here: p. 10; Neunreither, K., 2005. The European Parliament and national parliaments: conflict or cooperation? 
The Journal of Legislative Studies, 11(3-4), pp. 466-489, here: p. 469. 
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5. WHICH ROLE FOR NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN 
BUDGETARY AND ECONOMIC COORDINATION? 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The involvement of national parliaments in the preparation of Stability or 
Convergence Programmes and National Reform Programmes varies, as data 
for 2016 shows. Only a few parliaments have the possibility to vote on these 
documents. 
 The inter-parliamentary conference foreseen by Article 13 TSCG has met 
eight times since late 2013. The size and composition of the parliamentary 
delegations to the conference, however, are not defined which constitutes a major 
stumbling block for the institutionalisation of this body. 
 A debate is open about the future role of parliaments in the budgetary and 
economic coordination of the euro area. Three aspects are distinguished:  
 1. A “meaningful” inter-parliamentary control that could take different forms: a 
Eurozone Parliament, a less far-reaching Eurozone Assembly, a euro area 
component in the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic 
Coordination and Governance; 
 2. Institutional engineering in the European Parliament would lead to a euro 
area subcommittee; 
 3. The major part of the control would be exercised individually by each national 
parliament.  
This chapter addresses the existing practices of control related to the European Semester 
before proposing a first assessment of the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Stability, 
Economic Coordination and Governance in the EU. The options related to future form of 
parliamentary control over budget and economic issues are also discussed. 
5.1. The diversity of domestic parliamentary procedures related to 
the European Semester 
 
All Member States and National parliaments have had to cope with new rules related to 
budgetary discipline. Given the increasing influence of the Commission on the drafting of 
national budgets, the stakes are high.88 The coordination of national budgetary and 
economic policies at the EU level takes place in the framework of the European Semester. 
The roles that national parliaments have started to play in these processes are 
varying and domestic parliamentary procedures differ largely. Three major stages of the 
European Semester offer opportunities for national parliaments to exercise scrutiny: 
firstly, the Annual Growth Survey; secondly, national governments’ preparation and 
drafting of Stability or Convergence Programmes and National Reform Programmes; and 
thirdly, the Country-Specific Recommendations. 
 
                                           
88 Rozenberg, O. and Hefftler, C., 2015. Introduction. In Hefftler, C., Neuhold, C., Rozenberg, O. and Smith, J., 
eds., The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-39, 
here: p. 23. 
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5.1.1. From scrutiny 
 
Each year in November, the Annual Growth Survey (EU-wide economic policy priorities) 
and the Alert Mechanism Report (macro-economic imbalances) start a new cycle of the 
European Semester. This is the first stage of the European Semester. It takes place at the 
European level and these documents are scrutinised in the European Parliament. The Five 
Presidents’ Report stated in 2015 that as “a rule, national parliaments should be closely 
involved in the adoption of National Reform and Stability Programmes.”89 This is still not 
always the case, but national parliaments are generally becoming more involved in 
that second stage of the European Semester in order to discover their government’s plans, 
promises and pledges. This kind of parliamentary scrutiny mostly takes place in European 
affairs committees or Budget and Finance committees of national parliaments, before those 
programmes are sent to Brussels.90  
Table 4 shows the involvement of national parliaments in the preparation of 
Stability or Convergence Programmes and National Reform Programmes in 2016. 
The minimum requirement for participation in the preparation of these programmes, as 
defined by Raimla (2016), is informing the national parliament of the programmes before 
their submission at the end of April (ex-ante). The information from the text of these two 
programmes was complemented by information received from representatives of national 
parliaments.91 The data reveals that parliamentary involvement differs. In 2016, 16 
out of 28 national parliaments scrutinized Stability or Convergence Programmes and 
National Reform Programmes. In three Member States, national parliaments scrutinized the 
Stability or Convergence Programme, but not the National Reform Programme. Finally, 
there are nine countries whose national parliaments did not exercise scrutiny over these 
programmes before national governments submitted them to Brussels by the end of April 
2016. There is no apparent impact of Eurozone membership on the degree of parliamentary 
control (see Table 5). 
                                           
89 Juncker, J.-C., et al., 2015. Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union. Five Presidents’ Report. 
European Commission, p. 17. 
90 Kreilinger, V., 2016. Economic Policy Coordination in the EU: Linking national ownership and surveillance. 
Synthesis. Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin, pp. 2-3. 
91 Raimla, E., 2016. Involvement of the National Parliaments in SCPs and NRPs – 2014, 2015 and 2016. European 
Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Economic Governance Support Unit, p. 1. 
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Table 5: Involvement of National Parliaments in the European Semester (2016)  
Participation of 
respective national 
parliament in the 
preparation of: 
National Reform Programme 2016 
Yes No 
Stability or 
Convergence 
Programme 
2016 
Yes 
CZ, DK, DE, ES, FI, FR, 
HR, IT, LV, LT, LU, NL, 
PL, PT, SE, SI (16) 
BG, IE, UK (3) 
No -/- (0) 
AT, BE, CY, EE, EL*, HU, 
MT, RO, SK (9) 
Note: 
- * EL: Member State subject to a macro-economic adjustment programme not required to submit a fully-
fledged Stability Programme and National Reform Programme. 
- Member States whose currency is the Euro are printed in bold.  
Table: the author, following the tables in Hallerberg, M., et al., 2012. An Assessment of the European Semester. 
European Parliament, pp. 71-75.  
Data: Raimla, E., 2016. Involvement of the National Parliaments in SCPs and NRPs – 2014, 2015 and 2016. 
European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Economic Governance Support Unit. 
One of the national parliaments that have opted for a strong procedural way of 
adapting to the European Semester is the Danish Folketing. It created a separate 
“National Semester” and made the different stages of the European Semester subject to 
debates in joint committee meetings.92 At the other end of the spectrum of parliamentary 
adaptation – albeit also with a strong parliamentary role in the European Semester – is 
Finland, where Eduskunta stated in the questionnaire to the 21st bi-annual report of COSAC 
that existing rules for the parliamentary scrutiny of the annual budget process fit “nicely”93 
and did not need to be adapted to the European Semester.94 
5.1.2. To vote 
 
Possibly the strongest way of controlling the submissions of the national government in the 
European Semester is to give a national parliament the right to vote on the National 
Reform Programme or on the Stability or Convergence Programme before it is sent 
to the Commission by the end of April. Such a vote could be complemented by giving MPs 
the possibility to table amendments to these drafts. According to a 2014 survey by the 
European Parliament’s Directorate for Relations with National Parliaments, only a few 
national parliaments have voting or amending powers. Some assemblies vote directly on 
the Stability Programme (Portugal and supposedly France) or in the context of the broader 
examination of national budgetary documents (Estonia, Italy). Others have the possibility 
                                           
92 Folketing, 2013. Report on Consideration of the European Semester by the Danish Parliament. European Affairs 
Committee and Finance Committee, p. 2. 
93 COSAC, 2014. Annex to the Twenty-first Bi-annual Report: Developments in European Union. Procedures and 
Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny, p. 240. 
94 Kreilinger, V., 2016. National parliaments, surveillance mechanisms and ownership in the Euro Area. Jacques 
Delors Institut – Berlin, p. 30, pp. 35-36. 
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to adopt an opinion on the Programme that can be binding for the government (Finland), or 
they can vote on and amend the Stability Programme (Latvia).95  
Organising a vote is certainly preferable compared to a simple debate. Given the 
parliamentary nature of European governments, every delicate vote in lower assemblies 
can appear as a sign of political weakness for the executive power. With the sanction of a 
vote, national governments have strong incentives to fully justify their position and 
therefore can be considered held better accountable. However, the example of France in 
recent years shows that even strong prerogatives are not able to impede the government 
and its parliamentary majority from overruling or ignoring a (legal but not constitutional) 
requirement to put the Stability Programme formally before parliament and make it subject 
to a vote in plenary.96 
In addition, country-specific recommendations are subject to parliamentary scrutiny 
targeted at the national government as well as at the Commission. National parliaments 
usually scrutinise these recommendations after they have been adopted by the Council. 
Interestingly enough, countries with a higher implementation rate for country-specific 
recommendations seem to have national parliaments that have specifically adapted their 
internal procedures to the European Semester. Denmark is the frontrunner, while a group 
of six Member States (Belgium, Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and 
Slovenia) is lagging behind.97 
5.2. The difficult institutionalisation of the “Article 13 Conference” 
 
The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) has allowed for the creation 
of an inter-parliamentary conference in order to discuss budgetary policies and 
other issues covered by that treaty. 
Article 13 TSCG is the product of the intergovernmental negotiations and has undergone 
significant changes during the negotiating process, revealing the difficulties in reaching an 
agreement on this point. The final wording agreed by the Contracting Parties is as follows: 
“As provided for in Title II of Protocol (No. 1) on the role of national Parliaments in 
the European Union annexed to the European Union Treaties, the European 
Parliament and the national Parliaments of the Contracting Parties will together 
determine the organisation and promotion of a conference of representatives of the 
relevant committees of the European Parliament and representatives of the relevant 
committees of national Parliaments in order to discuss budgetary policies and other 
issues covered by this Treaty”.98 
The conclusions of the Speakers’ Conference in April 2013 provided the basis for bringing 
Article 13 TSCG into practice in October 2013. However, the Inter-Parliamentary 
Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance in the EU 
                                           
95 European Parliament, 2014. Review of Stability and Convergence Programmes by National Parliaments within 
the framework of the European Semester (Spotlight on Parliaments on Europe, n° 2), pp. 2-3. 
96 Assemblée nationale, 2015. Rapport d'information n° 3195, commission des affaires européennes sur le 
traitement des affaires européennes à l'Assemblée nationale déposé le 3 novembre 2015 par Philip Cordery et 
Pierre Lequiller. 
97 Parliaments in Spain, France, Lithuania, Austria and Latvia are also regarded as active. See: Kreilinger, V., 
2016. National parliaments, surveillance mechanisms and ownership in the Euro Area. Jacques Delors Institut – 
Berlin, pp. 5-7. 
98 Article 13 TSCG.  
The Role of National Parliaments in the EU after Lisbon: Potentialities and Challenges 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 47 
subsequently discussed for two years whether it should adopt Rules of Procedure and 
possible provisions.99  
The difficult institutionalisation of the inter-parliamentary conference reflects 
profound disagreements about which functions it should fulfil and what the actual purpose 
of inter-parliamentary cooperation should be: Should it decide? Should it control? Should it 
discuss? The key problem lies in overlapping authority claims between the European 
Parliament and national parliaments, not only in the field of Foreign and Security Policy100, 
but also in Economic and Financial Governance. An incremental and informal empowerment 
of the European Parliament clashes with national parliaments and their constitutional role 
linked to ratifying intergovernmental treaties such as the TSCG as well as their 
domestic role in controlling national governments. So far, this has prevented the possibility 
of efficiently sharing the scrutiny tasks between national parliaments and the European 
Parliament in budgetary and economic coordination.101 
The compromise on the Rules of Procedure102 that was found at the meeting of the 
conference in Luxembourg in November 2015 essentially codified existing practices. The 
conference meets twice a year, each delegation can determine its size and composition, 
and the first meeting of the year is connected to the European Parliamentary Week of the 
European Semester that takes place in the European Parliament. In the second half of the 
year, the conference meets in the Member State that holds the Council Presidency. The 
Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance in the 
EU is an example for the multiplication of inter-parliamentary forums since 2012 
(see 4.3) and essentially follows the new “standard model” of an inter-parliamentary 
conference that is used for COSAC and CFSP/CSDP. MPs from all 28 Member States, i.e. 
also those that have not (UK and Czech Republic) or not yet (Croatia) signed the TSCG, 
participate in the conference.  
Eight meetings of the “Article 13 Conference” have taken place between late 2013 and 
early 2017. As an attempt to control Economic governance that has been dominated by 
the executive(s), the provision of Article 13 TSCG was supposed to allow for “discuss[ing] 
budgetary policies and other issues” covered by that treaty. Yet, the meetings have moved 
beyond these topics and addressed more broadly defined economic policy, e.g. social 
affairs, growth and jobs. The key actors in Economic governance (Commissioners, 
Eurogroup) usually address the conference in speeches followed by Q&A sessions. In 
addition to the conference, an inter-parliamentary meeting to discuss the European 
Semester that is organised by the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) committee of the 
European Parliament in September each year brings together MPs and MEPs in this policy 
area. 
The functioning of the inter-parliamentary conference could be improved by better 
situating it in the overall EU institutional calendar. The meetings could, for instance, take 
place at critical junctures of the European Semester, e.g. in November or December after 
the Annual Growth Survey is presented and in June after country-specific recommendations 
                                           
99 See Kreilinger, V. and Larhant, M., 2016. Does the Eurozone need a Parliament? Jacques Delors Institut – 
Berlin, p. 6. 
100 Herranz-Surrallés, A., 2014. The EU’s multilevel parliamentary (battle) field: Inter-parliamentary cooperation 
and conflict in foreign and security policy. West European Politics, 37(5), 957-975. 
101 Kreilinger, V., 2016. National parliaments, surveillance mechanisms and ownership in the Euro Area. Jacques 
Delors Institut – Berlin, p. 57. 
102 Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance in the EU, 2015. Rules of 
Procedure.  
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are issued.103 This would encourage MPs and MEPs to participate actively and allow them to 
report back to their respective committees at the national level. Like in the case of the 
other inter-parliamentary conferences, the plenary sessions are dominated by prepared 
speeches and offer little room for spontaneous discussions. Parallel working groups, as they 
have been organised by the ECON, Budgets and Employment and Social Affairs committees 
of the European Parliament at the first meeting of the conference in the European 
Parliamentary Week, e.g. in 2016 and 2017, are an example for a greater specialisation 
within the inter-parliamentary conference. 
In terms of participation, between 60 and 80 MPs attend the meetings of the Inter-
Parliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance in the EU. 
There are divergences in the size and composition of national parliaments’ delegations, but 
the conference has achieved a greater involvement of sectoral committees: About half of 
the participating MPs is affiliated to Budget or Finance committees, one third to European 
affairs committees and the rest to other committees.104 It can be noted that the decision 
taken in 2015 not to define the size and composition of the parliamentary delegations to 
the conference – contrary to similar organisations such as the Inter-Parliamentary 
Conference on CFSP and CSDP – constitutes a major stumbling block for the 
institutionalisation of this new body. 
5.3. The on-going debates related to the parliamentary control of 
the EMU 
 
Undoubtedly, the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), based on the Five 
Presidents’ report, will also require an intensifying of parliamentary control. In their 
reflections on completing the EMU, the French Assemblée nationale105 and the UK House of 
Lords106 have set out proposals for strengthening parliamentary control in the EMU. 
Furthermore, the EP resolution on a “budgetary capacity for the Eurozone” of February 
2017 stresses that the EP and national parliaments  
“Should exercise a strengthened role in the renewed economic governance framework in 
order to reinforce democratic accountability. This includes increased national ownership on 
the European semester and a reform of the interparliamentary conference provided for in 
Article 13 of the Fiscal Compact to give it more substance, in order to develop a stronger 
parliamentary and public opinion.”107  
Parliamentary control of the EMU is a major issue and should already be tackled in the 
current set-up of the EMU. While some think that an innovative parliamentary body could 
create new political conditions for deepening the EMU, others argue that the deepening of 
EMU will lead to an intensification of parliamentary control in the EMU, more specifically 
related to the euro area. The idea of a “Eurozone Parliament” has re-emerged in the 
                                           
103 Assemblée nationale, 2015. Rapport d'information n° 3232, commission des affaires européennes sur la 
gouvernance de la zone euro déposé le 18 novembre 2015 par Christophe Caresche. 
104 Kreilinger, V., 2016. National parliaments, surveillance mechanisms and ownership in the Euro Area. Jacques 
Delors Institut – Berlin, p. 30, pp. 47-49. 
105 Assemblée nationale, 2016. Rapport d'information n° 4257, commission des affaires européennes sur le 
renforcement de l’Union économique et monétaire déposé le 3 novembre 2015 par Philip Cordery et Arnaud 
Richard.  
106 House of Lords European Union Committee, 2016. 'Whatever it takes': the Five Presidents' Report on 
completing Economic and Monetary Union. 13th Report of Session 2015-16. HL Paper 143.  
107 European Parliament, 2017. Resolution of 16 February 2017 on budgetary capacity for the Eurozone 
(2015/2344(INI)). P8_TA-PROV(2017)0050, item iii. 
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public debate, especially in France.108 It could inject more politics into the rules of 
economic governance that have featured the Eurogroup and the Commission. Such 
parliament could also be the logical consequence of the objective to create a separate 
budget for the Eurozone and constitute the democratic element of the EMU.109 It is 
important to note that the debate has found little echo in other Member States. In the 
following sections, three possible developments for parliamentary control in the EMU are 
outlined 
5.3.1. Meaningful inter-parliamentary control 
 
Under the current structure it is difficult to discern how inter-parliamentary control at the 
European Parliamentary Week and the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Stability, 
Economic Coordination and Governance in the EU could have a real impact. 
A meaningful inter-parliamentary control would follow the objective to make inter-
parliamentary cooperation more attractive to participants as well as more influential 
regarding major macroeconomic decisions, in particular for the euro area. Three proposals 
can be listed from being the most radical to being the most moderate: 
1. In order to respond to the need to better involve national parliamentarians, a 
regularly recalled solution is to create a “Eurozone Parliament” composed either 
of members of national parliaments and the European Parliament, or only of 
members of national parliaments. The latter would be “a parliamentary organ 
different from the European Parliament”.110 For instance, Thomas Piketty has been 
in favour of “a parliamentary chamber for the Euro Area made up of representatives 
of the national parliaments, in proportion to the population of each country and the 
different political groups”, which would “decide all budgetary and financial issues 
directly affecting the Euro Area, starting with the European Stability Mechanism, 
controlling deficits, and restructuring debt”.111  
2. Such radical proposals undoubtedly face strong opposition throughout Europe. An 
intermediate solution, formulated by Valentin Kreilinger and Morgan Larhant for the 
Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin, would be to create a “Eurozone Assembly” 
composed of MPs and MEPs, which could create sub-committees that would cover 
specific subjects of economic governance, such as the Annual Growth Survey or 
country-specific recommendations.112 
3. A less ambitious, but rather feasible option would be to create and establish a euro 
area component inside the inter-parliamentary conference of Article 13 
TSCG. 
Despite the difficulties in inter-parliamentary relations over the last years, national 
parliaments and the European Parliament are still generally convinced that their 
cooperation has an added value. In light of the need to find a common response to the 
                                           
108 See, amongst others, Hollande, F., « Ce qui nous menace, ce n’est pas l’excès d’Europe, mais son insuffisance 
», Journal du dimanche, 19 July 2015. His former minister for Economy, now candidate for the French presidential 
election, Emmanuel Macron also mentions the need for creating a Eurozone assembly in his platform. See Macron, 
E., 2016. Révolution. XO. 
109 Kreilinger, V. and Larhant, M., 2016. Does the Eurozone need a Parliament? Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin, p. 
3. 
110 Piris, J.-C., 2012. The Future of Europe. Towards a Two-Speed EU? Cambridge University Press, pp. 127-130. 
111 Piketty, T., 2016. La droite française et les critères budgétaires européens. Le Monde. 
http://piketty.blog.lemonde.fr/2016/10/18/la-droite-francaise-et-les-criteres-budgetaires-europeens/  
112 Kreilinger, V. and Larhant, M., 2016. Does the Eurozone need a Parliament? Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin, 
pp. 10-11. 
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threat of being marginalized and excluded from budgetary and economic coordination, it 
seems possible to agree on common measures to strengthen inter-parliamentary control. 
Beyond the institutional debate over the best-fitting type of assembly, it is also important 
to stress that a key point to achieve a meaningful inter-parliamentary control relates to 
working method, timing, Rules of Procedure and conditions for membership. 
As indicated below (6.2), the definition of the membership condition of such a network is 
especially a key condition to its success. Regardless of the type of forums selected, two 
representatives from Budget and Finance committee from all parliamentary 
assemblies – the chair and a deputy chair belonging to opposite political parties – 
would constitute a solid foundation for a genuine network of high flyer specialists. 
Given the existence of bicameral systems, this would require presenting four seats by 
Member States, which represents in the end a forum of one hundred members for the euro 
area (4 MPs x 19 Member States + 20 to 25 MEPs). 
5.3.2. Institutional engineering in the European Parliament 
 
The possibility to adapt the internal functioning of the European Parliament has been 
discussed for a long period of time. The European Parliament has held plenary and 
committee meetings that exclusively examined euro area matters, but not created specific 
structures. 
It would be possible to set up a euro area subcommittee in the European Parliament 
that would deal with euro area matters. Discrimination between MEPs on the premise of 
their nationality is prohibited, but a possibility to influence the composition of this sub-
committee exists through an informal agreement between the political groups. And bodies 
including MEPs from all Member States would again be responsible for economic 
governance beyond the euro area. 
It is unlikely that a proposal to divide the European Parliament, for example, the creation of 
a euro area component with decision-making power, be implemented. But, in the context of 
deepening the EMU, solutions that involve minor institutional engineering could find 
enough support inside the European Parliament. This would reinforce the European 
Parliament in Economic governance and create a parliamentary interlocutor for euro area 
matters.  
5.3.3. National parliaments fight back 
 
National parliaments have begun to dedicate time and resources to controlling budgetary 
and economic policy coordination. This has happened in an asymmetric way: some 
parliaments have been active, while others have been rather inactive (see Table 4 above).  
In the context of a discussion on completing the EMU, national parliaments become 
more aware of the importance of economic governance. The exchange of information 
and best practices via inter-parliamentary cooperation could lead to the diffusion of 
mechanisms that allow holding national governments accountable, for example, with 
respect to the National Stability and Reform Programmes that they submit to the 
Commission. 
The development of scrutiny activities of national parliaments, for instance, with respect to 
controlling their head of state or government before and/or after European Council and 
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euro area summits113 is an encouraging step in that direction. National parliaments have 
shown that they are able to respond to economic and budgetary coordination and “fight 
back”.114 
These three options are not mutually exclusive, but complement each other and 
they can be expected to frame the debates on strengthening parliamentary control in the 
EMU.  
                                           
113 Wessels, W., Rozenberg, O., Van Den Berge, M., Hefftler, C., Kreilinger, V. and Ventura, L., 2013. Democratic 
Control in the Member States of the European Council and the Euro zone summits. European Parliament. 
114 Raunio, T. and Hix, S., 2000. Backbenchers learn to fight back: European integration and parliamentary 
government. West European Politics, 23 (4), pp. 142-168. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES FOR NATIONAL 
GOVERNMENTS  
KEY FINDINGS 
 The participation of opposition parties in EU (national) parliamentary activities is a 
major challenge. Given the frequent fusion between a parliamentary majority and 
the government, any kinds of “red cards” given to national parliaments could 
indirectly strengthen the Council vis-à-vis other EU institutions. Various 
recommendations are formulated in order to grant the opposition with minimal 
rights in EU affairs – especially regarding parliamentary cooperation. 
 Genuine parliamentary cooperation could also be strengthened provided that it be 
based on existing standing committees rather than on new ad hoc forums. 
 An often-unnoticed issue regarding national parliaments lies in the differences of 
rhythm between national and EU politics. The on-going slow-down of the EU 
legislative process raises a problem of continuity for the activity of national 
parliaments. It calls for a cyclical and iterative parliamentary intervention that would 
not be limited to the first weeks of bargains. 
 The transparency of EU bargains during the legislative procedures is a major 
problem for national parliaments. The generalisation of agreements during the first 
reading calls for imposing less secrecy during trilogues – a process that has been 
engaged recently and in which national parliaments could play a greater role. The 
informality of the decision-making process within the Council of the EU constitutes 
another challenge for national parliaments for which no obvious solution emerges. 
In conclusion, different types of challenges regarding the role of national parliaments in EU 
affairs are listed, along with a few recommendations to address them. 
 
6.1. The participation of the opposition and the fusion between 
parliaments and governments 
 
Without any doubt, the pluralism of parliamentary representation is a central feature and 
justification for the parliamentary model.115 Genuine representation is not possible without 
giving a say to the opposing party. In EU affairs, the capacity for parliamentary opposition 
to weigh in on the European activities of the assemblies depends on the domestic legal 
rules (Constitution and Standing orders) as well as on the domestic balance of power. In 
several assemblies, it appears that the parliamentary majority, de facto placed under the 
authority of the Prime minister, fully controls either the initiative of a parliamentary activity 
or its content. This can be the case for initiating a parliamentary debate (e.g. before a 
European Council session), for deciding on whether this debate should be followed by a 
vote,and for issuing all kinds of parliamentary opinions. 
 
The fusion between the parliamentary majority and the executive power has 
important consequences regarding the EWM. In many cases, a national government 
pushes “its” parliament to raise a subsidiarity opinion in view of blocking or delaying a 
given legislative proposal. When parliamentary assemblies act more autonomously, 
                                           
115 Ihalainen, P., Ilie, C. and Palonen, K., eds., 2016. Parliament and Parliamentarism. A Comparative History of a 
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informal procedures of consultation exist at the political or administrative level to check 
that the parliamentary and governmental positions are consistent.  In the case of the third 
yellow card issued in 2016 on the revision of the Posted Workers Directive, it has been 
noted that the position of the Eastern European assemblies mobilised reflected the 
concerns of the governments of those countries. 
 
To a large extent, such indirect activation of national parliaments by the executive is 
inevitable.116 Yet, having them in mind can help assess the possible effects of the on-going 
proposals related to national parliaments. Any kinds of “red cards”, i.e. of procedures 
enabling national parliaments to block a legislative proposal before it has been discussed in 
the Council and the EP, would actually give the opportunity to some governments to try to 
block the opening of the ordinary legislative procedure.117 In Member States where the 
fusion between the parliamentary majority and the executive is significant, the 
government would therefore have two possibilities to act: indirectly at the start of 
the legislative procedure through their parliament, and directly after. 
 
Second, despite the proximity between the parliamentary majority and the government, 
some procedural requirements can be adopted in order to ensure or favour the participation 
of the opposition: 
- Best practices can be promoted regarding the role of the opposition in European 
activities within each assembly such as the right for the opposition to obtain the 
organisation of a floor debate before a European Council session with the 
participation of the Prime minister and a right to reply to his/her speech118, and the 
right of veto over the filtering of EU documents at the committee level…119 
- Regarding any kind of inter-parliamentary cooperation, the rule could be adopted 
within the rules of procedure of the various fora that any national parliamentary 
delegation should be pluralist, i.e. composed of at least one opposition member. 
This is already the case in most meetings. 
- As proposed by S. Kröger and R. Bellamy120, parliamentary minorities could 
even participate in elaborating parliamentary legislative initiatives. Above a 
given threshold, e.g. one third of the MPs, an initiative for a green card or an official 
opinion addressed to the Commission could be validated. 
 
The possibilities to act regarding the involvement of the parliamentary opposition(s) are 
thus numerous and generally require some sort of gentlemen agreements rather than new 
legal provisions. During a time when populist forces are progressing in many national 
chambers, usually sitting on the opposition benches, the stakes of involving minority 
political groups are particularly high. Involving anti-EU parties in interparliamentary 
cooperation could, over a long period of time, integrate national populist forces into EU 
politics. Given the multiple crises that Europe is facing today, it seems that EU decision-
makers can no longer afford the luxury of closing their doors to people who do not share 
their same views. 
 
                                           
116 Norton, P., ed., 1998. Parliaments and Governments in Western Europe. Frank Cass, 2nd ed. 
117 Rozenberg, O., 2013. Killing the EU rather than quitting it. Policy Network. http://www.policy-
network.net/articles/4484/Killing-the-EU-rather-than-quitting-it 
118 Wessels, W., Rozenberg, O., Van Den Berge, M., Hefftler, C., Kreilinger, V. and Ventura, L., 2013. Democratic 
Control in the Member States of the European Council and the Euro zone summits. European Parliament. 
119 I.e. the right to obtain that an EU document is regarded as politically important and treated as such by the 
assembly. 
120 Kröger, S. and Bellamy, R., 2016. Beyond a Constraining Dissensus: The Role of National Parliaments in 
Domesticating and Normalising the Politicization of European Integration, Comparative European Politics 14, pp. 
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6.2. The quality and effectiveness of inter-parliamentary 
cooperation 
 
Inter-parliamentary cooperation faces numerous challenges. The occasionally difficulties in 
cooperation between national parliaments and the EP were mentioned above in the cases 
of the settlement of the fora related to CFSP or to budget issues (Art.13 of the TSCG). 
There is also a threat of routinization of the cooperation with biannual or annual meetings 
organized with a limited involvement from the MPs and limited outcomes as well. The 
contrast is striking between the collaborative practices at the civil service level121, and the 
difficulty of involving a large number of backbenchers (beyond some European Affairs 
Committees ‘club’ members).122 
 
Several possible reforms for improving the quality of inter-parliamentary relations 
have already been listed at the end of part 4. More generally, it appears that the most 
promising approach for answering those challenges relies on the deepening of committee-
based inter-parliamentary cooperation.123 A committee approach could partly answer 
both the motivational and the outcome problems. Established forms of cooperation between 
committees according to policy fields already exist on a more or less formalized basis. 
Those networks could be expanded and deepened in several fields such as Justice and 
Home Affairs (as it will be logically the case with the future “Europol parliamentary 
conference”), environment, agriculture or regional development – to name a few sectors 
where the European legislation is present. Regarding the budget and economic issues, a 
small network of Budget committee chairs and deputy chairs from the main opposite party  
could be a more fitted structure than the uncertain frame of the large Inter-parliamentary 
Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance. 
6.3. The differences of rhythm between EU and national politics 
 
A major challenge regarding national parliaments’ participation in EU affairs has to do with 
the question of timing. When the financial crisis was at its peak, national parliaments 
suffered from an acceleration of decision-making processes in Brussels. The instability of 
the Eurozone called for urgent decisions that were hardly compatible with respect for 
parliamentary practices and procedures.124 Yet, the treaty of Lisbon has helped to limit this 
problem by granting an eight-week period between the official Commission proposal and 
the discussions within the Council. 
More generally, the view that the national transposition of EU legislation (that often 
requires a vote in Parliament) takes too much time, can be highlighted by European 
decision-makers in order to give priority to regulations over directives. The observations 
made at Sciences Po about legislative productivity indicate that after a massive lowering of 
the number of EU legislative acts adopted in 2010, the number of regulations decided 
                                           
121 For instance through the parliamentary representatives network in Brussels. Neuhold, C. and Högenauer, A.-L., 
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yearly slowly increased again (around 60 per year) while the number of directives remained 
stable and historically low (around 15).125 
Regarding the issue of timing, another – rather unnoticed – aspect becomes progressively 
salient: the slow-down of the EU legislative process. It took a mean of 337 days to 
adopt the 256 legislative acts definitively voted on in 1996. Less than twenty years later in 
2014, the 151 acts adopted had, on average, been discussed for 634 days. Such an 
increase is conspicuous. It questions the effectiveness of the timing of national parliaments’ 
participation. Should they have their say very early in the procedure? The eight-week 
period of the EWM invites them to do so. This logic of ‘the earlier the better’ is at the heart 
of the lobbying strategies in Brussels from private or public actors. Yet, it may be difficult 
at the beginning of the process to distinguish which political stakes are relevant and to 
receive full information about the position of the national government. In addition, an 
intervention during the last stages of the policy-process may prove more crucial if a 
national assembly seek to support its government in the bargains. 
Beyond this issue, the deceleration of the legislative procedure also contributes to a loss of 
continuity of the national parliamentary activity. The almost two-year duration of the 
legislative procedure (preceded by a period of consultation managed by the Commission) 
makes it likely that the national MPs active at the beginning and the end of the process 
may not be the same – the average lifespan of a parliamentary majority in Europe being 
around three years.  
There are no obvious solutions to this major issue. Yet, the longer duration of the 
legislation procedure indicates that the national parliamentary intervention, both 
individually and collectively, cannot be limited to the consultation periods and the 
first weeks of discussion. A flexible and iterative approach seems to be necessary so 
that a better follow-up of the parliamentary actions may be provided. 
6.4. Information and transparency related the EU policy-making 
system 
 
The lack of information was a frequent complaint from national parliaments in the 1990s 
and in the early 2000s. Then, national procedures in most countries have progressively 
imposed a large diffusion of EU documents to national parliaments. The Lisbon Treaty, 
anticipated by José Manuel Barroso, provided for a direct transmission of legislative 
proposals from the Commission to the assemblies. Most of the parliaments have also 
learned to deal with information overload by designing procedures aimed at sorting 
documents and by employing clerks to that end. In short, the situation has improved. 
Yet, certain problems remain and have become even more critical, such as the bargains 
within the EU institutional triangle and the decision-making process of the Council of the 
EU. 
Regarding the first point, the generalisation of 1st reading agreements within the 
ordinary legislative process is a well-known phenomenon. It concerned 93% of the 
legislative acts adopted in 2014. This trend contributes to reduce the level of publicity of 
the bargains. The disagreement and convergence that a second and third reading could 
have made (partly) public are, to some extent, hidden by trilogue meetings behind closed 
doors. This makes it more difficult for national parliaments to follow the discussions and, 
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consequently, to weigh in on them. Therefore, the diverse on-going reforms, suggestions126 
and pressures127 regarding greater transparency within trilogues can be positively 
interpreted  from a national parliament perspective – should they seize this opportunity. 
On 13 April 2016, an Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-making was published.128 
It sets an objective of improving transparency during bargains and mentions the provision 
of information to national Parliaments. It also foresees building a joint legislative database 
that could be a valuable instrument for national parliaments and, beyond them, for citizens. 
A national parliamentary entry into the base or a connection between the IPEX web site and 
the future base could be developed. In reaction to this agreement, the EP adopted a 
decision mentioning the need to inform and associate national parliaments.129 The text 
especially assesses positively the political dialogue procedure and emphasises “the need for 
greater flexibility in the enforcement of the eight week deadline” of Protocol No. 1 (para. 
12). It also mentions the significance of “the provision of information to national 
parliaments” during the legislative process (para. 16). More indirectly, it can be noted that 
on 13 December 2016, the EP amended its Rules of Procedure in order to give a larger role 
to the plenary regarding the starting of the negotiations. This reform could give national 
parliaments a political background regarding the on-going bargains since each of the EP 
party groups must take an official position on the draft act.  
Secondly, the informal and partly secret practices of cooperation within the Council 
of the EU are detrimental to national parliaments. Even though the ministerial votes are 
now recorded and easily accessible, the information is more parcelled regarding 
parliamentary reserves.130 The habit taken to postpone a vote, once a political agreement 
has been found, contributes in many cases to defuse the significance of those reserves. 
Indeed, in some cases, ministers must only to wait for the clearing of the reserves from 
their parliament in order to officially agree to the proposed act – sometimes within an 
unrelated formation of the Council.   
Due to the degree of informality that allows for international organisations to create 
compromises131, formulating recommendations is a meticulous process. Yet, some reforms 
are possible, for instance regarding the information given by the Secretariat of the Council 
on parliamentary reserves or by avoiding the adoption of a legislative act by an unrelated 
formation of the Council. In other words, everything that could “parliamentarise” the 
functioning of the Council of the EU would be beneficial to… national parliaments. 
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ANNEXES 
ANNEX 1. Protocol (No. 1) on the Role of National Parliaments in the 
European Union 
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, 
RECALLING that the way in which national Parliaments scrutinise their governments in 
relation to the activities of the Union is a matter for the particular constitutional 
organisation and practice of each Member State, 
DESIRING to encourage greater involvement of national Parliaments in the activities of the 
European Union and to enhance their ability to express their views on draft legislative acts 
of the Union as well as on other matters which may be of particular interest to them, 
HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty on 
European Union, to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to the Treaty 
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community: 
TITLE I 
INFORMATION FOR NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS  
Article 1 
Commission consultation documents (green and white papers and communications) shall be 
forwarded directly by the Commission to national Parliaments upon publication. The 
Commission shall also forward the annual legislative programme as well as any other 
instrument of legislative planning or policy to national Parliaments, at the same time as to 
the European Parliament and the Council. 
Article 2 
Draft legislative acts sent to the European Parliament and to the Council shall be forwarded 
to national Parliaments. 
For the purposes of this Protocol, "draft legislative acts" shall mean proposals from 
the Commission, initiatives from a group of Member States, initiatives from the 
European Parliament, requests from the Court of Justice, recommendations from the 
European Central Bank and requests from the European Investment Bank, for the adoption 
of a legislative act. 
Draft legislative acts originating from the Commission shall be forwarded to national 
Parliaments directly by the Commission, at the same time as to the European Parliament 
and the Council. 
Draft legislative acts originating from the European Parliament shall be forwarded to 
national Parliaments directly by the European Parliament. 
Draft legislative acts originating from a group of Member States, the Court of Justice, the 
European Central Bank or the European Investment Bank shall be forwarded to national 
Parliaments by the Council. 
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Article 3 
National Parliaments may send to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission a reasoned opinion on whether a draft legislative act complies with the 
principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Protocol on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
If the draft legislative act originates from a group of Member States, the President of the 
Council shall forward the reasoned opinion or opinions to the governments of those Member 
States. 
If the draft legislative act originates from the Court of Justice, the European Central Bank 
or the European Investment Bank, the President of the Council shall forward the reasoned 
opinion or opinions to the institution or body concerned. 
Article 4 
An eight-week period shall elapse between a draft legislative act being made available to 
national Parliaments in the official languages of the Union and the date when it is placed on 
a provisional agenda for the Council for its adoption or for adoption of a position under a 
legislative procedure. Exceptions shall be possible in cases of urgency, the reasons for 
which shall be stated in the act or position of the Council. Save in urgent cases for which 
due reasons have been given, no agreement may be reached on a draft legislative act 
during those eight weeks. Save in urgent cases for which due reasons have been given, a 
ten-day period shall elapse between the placing of a draft legislative act on the provisional 
agenda for the Council and the adoption of a position. 
Article 5 
The agendas for and the outcome of meetings of the Council, including the minutes of 
meetings where the Council is deliberating on draft legislative acts, shall be forwarded 
directly to national Parliaments, at the same time as to Member States' governments. 
Article 6 
When the European Council intends to make use of the first or second subparagraphs of 
Article 48(7) of the Treaty on European Union, national Parliaments shall be informed of the 
initiative of the European Council at least six months before any decision is adopted. 
Article 7 
The Court of Auditors shall forward its annual report to national Parliaments, for 
information, at the same time as to the European Parliament and to the Council. 
Article 8 
Where the national Parliamentary system is not unicameral, Articles 1 to 7 shall apply to 
the component chambers. 
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TITLE II 
INTERPARLIAMENTARY COOPERATION  
Article 9 
The European Parliament and national Parliaments shall together determine the 
organisation and promotion of effective and regular interparliamentary cooperation within 
the Union. 
Article 10 
A conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs may submit any contribution it 
deems appropriate for the attention of the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission. That conference shall in addition promote the exchange of information and 
best practice between national Parliaments and the European Parliament, including their 
special committees. It may also organise interparliamentary conferences on specific topics, 
in particular to debate matters of common foreign and security policy, including common 
security and defence policy. Contributions from the conference shall not bind national 
Parliaments and shall not prejudge their positions. 
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ANNEX 2. Protocol (No 2) on the Application of the Principles of 
Subsidiarity and Proportionality 
 
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, 
WISHING to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizens of the 
Union, 
RESOLVED to establish the conditions for the application of the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality, as laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union, and to 
establish a system for monitoring the application of those principles, 
HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty on 
European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: 
Article 1 
Each institution shall ensure constant respect for the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, as laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. 
Article 2 
Before proposing legislative acts, the Commission shall consult widely. Such consultations 
shall, where appropriate, take into account the regional and local dimension of the action 
envisaged. In cases of exceptional urgency, the Commission shall not conduct such 
consultations. It shall give reasons for its decision in its proposal. 
Article 3 
For the purposes of this Protocol, "draft legislative acts" shall mean proposals from 
the Commission, initiatives from a group of Member States, initiatives from the 
European Parliament, requests from the Court of Justice, recommendations from the 
European Central Bank and requests from the European Investment Bank, for the adoption 
of a legislative act. 
Article 4 
The Commission shall forward its draft legislative acts and its amended drafts to national 
Parliaments at the same time as to the Union legislator. 
The European Parliament shall forward its draft legislative acts and its amended drafts to 
national Parliaments. 
The Council shall forward draft legislative acts originating from a group of Member States, 
the Court of Justice, the European Central Bank or the European Investment Bank and 
amended drafts to national Parliaments. 
Upon adoption, legislative resolutions of the European Parliament and positions of the 
Council shall be forwarded by them to national Parliaments. 
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Article 5 
Draft legislative acts shall be justified with regard to the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. Any draft legislative act should contain a detailed statement making it 
possible to appraise compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. This 
statement should contain some assessment of the proposal's financial impact and, in the 
case of a directive, of its implications for the rules to be put in place by Member States, 
including, where necessary, the regional legislation. The reasons for concluding that a 
Union objective can be better achieved at Union level shall be substantiated by qualitative 
and, wherever possible, quantitative indicators. Draft legislative acts shall take account of 
the need for any burden, whether financial or administrative, falling upon the Union, 
national governments, regional or local authorities, economic operators and citizens, to be 
minimised and commensurate with the objective to be achieved. 
Article 6 
Any national Parliament or any chamber of a national Parliament may, within eight weeks 
from the date of transmission of a draft legislative act, in the official languages of the 
Union, send to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
a reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the draft in question does not comply with 
the principle of subsidiarity. It will be for each national Parliament or each chamber of a 
national Parliament to consult, where appropriate, regional parliaments with legislative 
powers. 
If the draft legislative act originates from a group of Member States, the President of the 
Council shall forward the opinion to the governments of those Member States. 
If the draft legislative act originates from the Court of Justice, the European Central Bank 
or the European Investment Bank, the President of the Council shall forward the opinion to 
the institution or body concerned. 
Article 7 
1.   The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and, where appropriate, 
the group of Member States, the Court of Justice, the European Central Bank or the 
European Investment Bank, if the draft legislative act originates from them, shall take 
account of the reasoned opinions issued by national Parliaments or by a chamber of a 
national Parliament. 
Each national Parliament shall have two votes, shared out on the basis of the national 
Parliamentary system. In the case of a bicameral Parliamentary system, each of the two 
chambers shall have one vote. 
2.   Where reasoned opinions on a draft legislative act's non-compliance with the principle 
of subsidiarity represent at least one third of all the votes allocated to the national 
Parliaments in accordance with the second subparagraph of paragraph 1, the draft must be 
reviewed. This threshold shall be a quarter in the case of a draft legislative act submitted 
on the basis of Article 76 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on the 
area of freedom, security and justice. 
After such review, the Commission or, where appropriate, the group of Member States, the 
European Parliament, the Court of Justice, the European Central Bank or the European 
Investment Bank, if the draft legislative act originates from them, may decide to maintain, 
amend or withdraw the draft. Reasons must be given for this decision. 
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3.   Furthermore, under the ordinary legislative procedure, where reasoned opinions on the 
non-compliance of a proposal for a legislative act with the principle of subsidiarity represent 
at least a simple majority of the votes allocated to the national Parliaments in accordance 
with the second subparagraph of paragraph 1, the proposal must be reviewed. After such 
review, the Commission may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the proposal. 
If it chooses to maintain the proposal, the Commission will have, in a reasoned opinion, to 
justify why it considers that the proposal complies with the principle of subsidiarity. This 
reasoned opinion, as well as the reasoned opinions of the national Parliaments, will have to 
be submitted to the Union legislator, for consideration in the procedure: 
(a) before concluding the first reading, the legislator (the European Parliament and the 
Council) shall consider whether the legislative proposal is compatible with the principle 
of subsidiarity, taking particular account of the reasons expressed and shared by the 
majority of national Parliaments as well as the reasoned opinion of the Commission; 
(b) if, by a majority of 55 % of the members of the Council or a majority of the votes cast in 
the European Parliament, the legislator is of the opinion that the proposal is not 
compatible with the principle of subsidiarity, the legislative proposal shall not be given 
further consideration. 
Article 8 
The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction in actions on grounds of 
infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a legislative act, brought in accordance with 
the rules laid down in Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union by 
Member States, or notified by them in accordance with their legal order on behalf of their 
national Parliament or a chamber thereof. 
In accordance with the rules laid down in the said Article, the Committee of the Regions 
may also bring such actions against legislative acts for the adoption of which the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union provides that it be consulted. 
Article 9 
The Commission shall submit each year to the European Council, the European Parliament, 
the Council and national Parliaments a report on the application of Article 5 of the Treaty on 
European Union. This annual report shall also be forwarded to the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions. 
 
 
 

